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SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF GOD IN RELATION TO HIS CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY

PROFESSOR T. M. FORSYTH

"The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, here."[1]

IN a previous article I considered Aristotle's view of God as final cause and its relation to the philosophy of Plato;[2] and at the end of the article I remarked on the affinity of both doctrines with that of Spinoza. The present paper is concerned with Spinoza's doctrine of God as it is related to his conception of causality and seeks, *inter alia*, to show that his explicit rejection of final causes does not prevent his philosophy from having in it something like the true principle of final causation. In each section I first quote the chief relevant definitions or propositions in Spinoza's *Ethics*,[3] and then state what seems needful in the way of interpretation or comment.

Causa Sui = ULTIMATE REALITY

"By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless exist-

[1] Santayana's beautiful rendering of the concluding words of Ernest Renan's commemorative address at the unveiling of the statue of Spinoza at The Hague. The whole address is contained in *Spinoza: Four Essays* (edited by Knight).

[2] "Aristotle's Concept of God as Final Cause" (*Philosophy*, Vol. xxii, No. 82, July, 1947).

[3] The passages cited are all from the *Ethics*, and I have followed Hale White's translation unless the text seemed to warrant a somewhat different wording. Except on one or two points I have made no references to particular expositors or commentators. My love for Spinoza goes gack to my student days half a century ago; but, with much else claiming attention, anything I have hitherto written on his philosophy has been confined to class lectures and an address delivered to a Jewish community on the occasion of the Spinoza Tercentenary in 1932. What follows aims at giving a concise statement on the subject immediately concerned.

ing."[1] "By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself."[2] "It pertains to the nature of substance to exist."[3]

The first definition of Spinoza's *Ethics* lays the foundation for his whole system of philosophy. It expresses his fundamental intuition—that of the unity of all reality—in the idea of an ultimate or absolute reality as the necessary cause or ground of all that is. This alone is truly substance or self-subsistent reality. It is the absolutely self-dependent, on which all else depends, and is therefore at once the ultimate in being or existence and in thought or knowledge.

To the objection that a self-causing cause is logically inconceivable the appropriate answer seems to be that the term "cause of itself" (or "its own cause")—like Plato's "self-mover" and Aristotle's "unmoved mover," which have likewise been called wholly unintelligible—seeks to apply the most fitting idea available to what is in actual fact not fully expressible. Reality is not unknowable: on the contrary, it is just what is known in all knowledge; but no terms are wholly adequate to its being and nature. Again, to the criticism[4] that Spinoza's idea of substance, *causa sui*, is a substantiation or hypostatization of logic and of logical necessity, and gives no real or ontological necessity, one may perhaps reply that the defect, if such there be, lies in the method rather than in the significance of Spinoza's philosophy, and that the whole tenor of his doctrine implies that the logical is only one aspect, though an essential aspect, of the real or ontological. For Spinoza there is an inherent relation between thought and being such that what is found to be necessary for thought can be taken as true of existence.[5]

Spinoza's method of exposition of his philosophical principles is particularly open to criticism in that he seems to begin from an abstract concept of being, which makes impossible his ever reaching the concrete reality whose nature and action it is his purpose to disclose. But what he wants to affirm is a reality that is not indeterminate but fully determinate and therefore the determinant of all lesser or derivative forms of existence. Such reality is not the negation of all characters and relations but their totality or correlation. Accordingly the infinite is not the mere negation of the finite, it is the finite that is the negation of the infinite; or rather, each is the necessary counterpart of the other.

Another deficiency, or another aspect of the same deficiency, in Spinoza's mode of statement is that he seems from the outset to

[1] *Ethics* I, Def. 1. [2] Def. 3. [3] Ibid. Prop. 7.

[4] Made, e.g., by Jacques Maritain in one of the essays in his volume entitled *Redeeming the Time*.

[5] This conception is expressed, e.g., in his statement that "it is of the nature of the mind to frame true ideas."

assert the unity of reality in a way that involves denial of all real difference or diversity. That this is not Spinoza's intention, even if his exposition be faulty, is shown by the principles he affirms in the subsequent parts of his great treatise. It is seen especially in his doctrine of the self-maintaining or self-realizing impulse, which is the very essence of each particular being, and by virtue of which every creature strives after the preservation and fulfilment of its own nature. Spinoza's whole philosophy has this implication of diversity along with unity, although the unity may throughout be overstressed. Indeed it has been said that Spinoza's philosophy is one of the greatest efforts in the entire history of human thought to give adequate expression to the principle of unity in diversity as the fundamental character of reality. Unity and difference are meaningless apart from each other, and an infinite unity must be realized or expressed in infinite variety. This principle of individuality and self-persistence will be treated more fully in a later section.

GOD AS THE ONE REALITY

"By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence."[1] God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, necessarily exists.[2] "Besides God no substance can be or be conceived."[3] "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without God."[4]

The ultimate reality, which he has initially posited, Spinoza forthwith identifies with God. He does so because to it must pertain all fullness of being and completeness of nature, and because God must be conceived as eternal, infinite and perfect being. If God is to be all that is truly meant by God, nothing else will suffice; since anything less than this falsifies the divine nature by turning it into something finite and therefore imperfect.

God, so conceived, necessarily exists, because existence is involved in the very nature of the being thus defined. Or, as Spinoza expresses the same principle in a somewhat less abstract form, the more perfection and therefore the more reality anything has, the more has it power to exist and therefore necessarily exists.[5] This is Spinoza's version of the ontological argument for the existence of God, or rather his substitute for it.[6] For Spinoza, therefore, nothing is

[1] *Ethics*, I, Def. 6. [2] Ibid., Prop. 11. [3] Prop. 14. [4] Prop. 15.

[5] Cf. I, 11, Dem. and II, Def. 6 ("By reality and perfection I understand the same thing").

[6] As his alternative proofs taken together show, Spinoza's demonstration combines the ontological and the cosmological arguments; and it may also be said to accord with the logical principle that all necessity is hypothetical inasmuch as it takes the form: If anything exists, God exists.

surer or can be surer than the existence of God. That anything exists at all involves the existence of infinite and perfect being, since otherwise the finite and imperfect would have more power or capacity to exist than the infinite and perfect.

In identifying God with the one substance or ultimate reality Spinoza is neither merely using conventional language nor forcing his terminology upon a principle or conception to which it is inappropriate. He is expressing his insight into the real meaning of the concepts concerned and is convinced that he is not misinterpreting but reinterpreting common thought and usage. Taking the accepted definition of substance as that which needs nothing else for its conception or its existence and the customary idea of God as an infinite and absolutely perfect being (*ens perfectissimum*), he shows that there can be only one such substance and that this can only be God—or God can only be this.

Objection may be taken to the use of the word "God" unless it expressly connotes a personal being as the creator and ruler of the world. But it is Spinoza's supreme merit that he takes the bold step of identifying the God of religion with the ultimate reality which philosophical thought compels him to affirm, and thereby makes possible the union of the quest of truth and the worship of the living God. It may be that the God of true religion is more properly to be conceived as superpersonal, if not as impersonal,[1] rather than as personal. But whatever be the solution of this theological or metaphysical problem, Spinoza's doctrine is in principle indefeasible. If religion is to be defined as the sentiment of the holy, or the sense of the numinous, then what alone can ultimately satisfy the need concerned is not any finite object of awe or reverence, but assuredly the perfect and sublime as revealed in the infinite whole of reality.[2]

Spinoza's conception of God as the only true substance or the one reality implies, further, the identification in some sense of God and Nature, or of God with the world which is commonly spoken of as his creation. This is signified by the expression "God or Nature."[3] But he adopts from Scholastic philosophy the distinction of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*[4] to denote a certain self-differentiation in the absolute reality implying two distinguishable though inseparable aspects or characters. In terms of Spinoza's fundamental

[1] Cf. "At all times and in every part of the world mystics of the first order have always agreed that the ultimate reality, apprehended in the process of meditation, is essentially impersonal" (Aldous Huxley).

[2] Cf. Spinoza's own statement of his quest and problem in *De Intellectus Emendatione*, I. One may also recall Carlyle's fine saying: "This Universe . . . is a living thing—ah, an unspeakable, godlike thing; towards which the best attitude for us . . . is awe, devout prostration and humility of soul; worship if not in words, then in silence" (*Heroes and Hero-Worship*).

[3] IV, Pref.

[4] I, 29, Schol.

principle, *causa sui*, the former is God as self-*cause* or ground of all existence, the latter is God as self-*caused* or consequent, that is, his manifestation in all existence. To the one belong the infinite attributes of God, such as thought and extension; to the other the infinitude of diverse modes under each of these, namely all bodies as particular modifications of infinite motion and rest and all thoughts or ideas as comprised in infinite intellect.[1]

It may be held that any such self-diremption of the one substance or reality cannot be made intelligible on his logical principles as an actual significant element in Spinoza's system. But the spirit of his philosophy, if not its logic, involves a duality-in-unity which may be expressed by distinguishing between the divine activity in all the processes of nature or the work of creation (not at one point of time but as continuous action) and the relative passivity of facts and things as they are made or have become.[2] Without this aspect of differentiation or self-negation in the infinite reality there could not be the complementary self-affirmation or reaffirmation implied in the progressive becoming or perfecting of the finite.[3]

GOD THE ONLY TRUE CAUSE

Causi sui, when the implications of the principle are unfolded, involves the conception that God or infinite and perfect being is not only the one real substance but also the one real cause. What are commonly called causes can only be the conditions under which, in accordance with the nature of reality, this or that particular finite expression of its being comes into existence. Moreover, the term "cause of itself," duly interpreted, already indicates that the causal relation of the infinite to the finite differs from that of one finite being or thing to another. Spinoza's explicit statements concerning the divine causation may be considered under the headings: (1) God's causality is immanent causality; (2) God alone is a free cause; (3) God does not act for an end.

(1) *God's causality is immanent causality.*—"From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinitude of things in infinite ways."[4] "God is the efficient (or active) cause of all things. . . . God is absolutely the first cause."[5] "God is the immanent, and not the transient (or transitive) cause of all things."[6]

As is implied in what has already been said, God is the first cause, or creator, of the world or cosmos, not as existing and acting externally to it, but as its indwelling power or activity, its inmost reality.

[1] The further distinctions are not necessary for my present purpose.

[2] This is what is properly signified by the opposition of "spirit" and "nature."

[3] Cf. below.

[4] I, 16.

[5] Ibid., Corol. 1 and 3.

[6] Prop. 18.

God is not the remote cause of any thing or event in the sense of being removed from it in time with intermediate causes coming in between. The reciprocal relations of different finite things or beings to one another are seen as an endless series of causes and effects, each of which conditions and is in turn conditioned by that which precedes or follows it.[1] But the infinite is related to the finite not as one particular thing or individual is to another but as the universal ground or common basis of all existence. This relation cannot be expressed in terms of time or succession; it is in the nature of a timeless fact or eternal truth. Further, God is the efficient cause of all things, not as being only the cause of the beginning of their existence and not also of their persistence or continuance in existence; for the nature or essence of particular things does not in itself involve either existence or duration, since it is to the nature of God alone that existence necessarily pertains.[2]

Spinoza's doctrine of immanent causation is doubtless connected historically with the mechanical conception of nature associated with the names of Descartes and Hobbes. Consequently the action of the world-ground is expressed in terms appropriate to mechanical causation and to the concept of the conservation and transformation of energy. But the philosophy of Spinoza does not involve acceptance of the mechanist principle as the last word in the explanation of natural events. It is rather an attempt to interpret this in conformity with other and more fundamental concepts. The essential significance of the doctrine is that everything is connected both existentially and causally with everything else, and that all action and reaction are ultimately dependent on the underlying nature of the eternal reality.

(2) *God alone is a free cause.*—"That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone."[3] "God acts from the laws (or the necessity) of his own nature only."[4] "The will cannot be called a free cause, but can only be called necessary."[5] "Things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than they have been produced."[6]

The term "cause of itself," besides expressing the ultimate identity of essence and existence, also indicates the true unity of freedom and necessity. That God is the only fully free cause follows from the fact that his nature alone essentially involves existence. And the same principle implies that God's activity is a necessity of his nature, or rather that his nature and his activity are one and the same thing. What follows from the existence and nature of God may be called the expression of his will, but not in a sense that would make this will arbitrary or anything less than his whole being. Hence there is no

[1] Prop. 28 and Schol. [2] Prop. 24. [3] Def. 7.
[4] Prop. 17. [5] Prop. 32. [6] Prop. 33.

real distinction between the truly necessary and the actually possible;[1] for whatever has power or reality enough to exist does exist and with the degree of perfection involved in its own nature.

Further, since all things are determined to existence and action by God as following from the necessity of his nature, there is nothing that exists or happens in the world which does not result of necessity from determinate causes or conditions.[2] Along with all other finite things and creatures man's activity is thus necessitated. But none the less the finite individual shares in the freedom of God, so that his action is free in proportion as it is determined from within by his own proper nature and not merely by conditions external to himself.

Spinoza thus denies free will in the sense of an indeterminism that implies the "liberty of indifference,"[3] or an absolute power of choosing between alternative courses of action altogether independently of the agent's dispositions and beliefs and the bearing upon these of the conditions involved in his relations to other beings and things. Freedom and necessity are ultimately one, and the only valid opposition between them is that of the relative predominance of internal or of external factors in the determination of any particular action or course of action. An act is free just in so far as it is the expression of the agent's innermost being. There is nothing, therefore, in Spinoza's denial of absolute freedom of will that is inconsistent with his conception of the liberating power or influence of "adequate ideas," or the entrance into the human mind of the truth that makes men free. The one principle is indeed the complement of the other.

(3) *God does not act for an end.*—"There is no cause, either without or within himself, that moves God to act except the perfection of his own nature."[4] "It is commonly supposed that God directs all

[1] Leibniz's conception that God in creating the universe acts in accordance not with the only possibility but with his choice of the best—which is regarded as uniting efficient and final causation—shows the distinction between abstract and concrete possibility, but cannot be taken to express a wholly different principle from that of Spinoza. Cf. the statement: "The divine perfection . . . could also be manifested through other creatures in another order" (Johannes Stufler—following Thomas Aquinas—in *Why God Created the World*), which is likewise tenable only if it precludes the idea of an arbitrary volition.

[2] I, 26–29 and II, 48.

[3] The stress laid by Descartes upon the influence of will on judgment—like a similar principle in Bacon's philosophy—concerns the need of suspense of judgment, or the avoidance (as he puts it) of "precipitancy and anticipation" in judgment through bias or undue haste, and does not properly involve the liberty of indifference. But Spinoza expressly rejects an antithesis of will and intellect in so far as it suggests that volition and judgment do not depend essentially on ideas. ("There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which an idea as such involves." II, 49 with Corol. and Schol.)

[4] I, 17, Corol. 1.

things to some determinate end. . . . This doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily seeks something of which he stands in need."[1]

Spinoza's argument here is that action for the sake of an end is a mark of a finite and imperfect being, whose existence can only be maintained or whose true nature can only be realized by seeking and attaining a goal beyond actual fulfilment. Such a conception, implying as it does a lack or want in the agent concerned, is meaningless in reference to an infinite and perfect being whose nature is eternally complete. If we are to speak of a divine purpose at all, it can only be in the sense that it belongs to the perfection of God's nature that he should manifest himself in the creation of finite beings who can share in that perfection according to the degree in which they attain self-realization. This signifies not any external but an immanent end.

Spinoza's doctrine on this point is linked with his denial of final causes in nature. Man habitually acts for some end and devises means to its attainment, and he thinks that the same is true of nature or creation generally. More particularly, he thinks that God has made all things for the sake of man—to serve the ends and purposes of human beings—and that things and events in nature can be judged to be good or bad according as they do or do not further the fulfilment of these ends. But "the perfection of things is to be judged by their own nature and power alone." In the infinite fullness of his being there is nothing wanting to God "for the creation of everything, from the highest down to the lowest grade of perfection"; and things have no other reason than the expression of his being.[2] As products or manifestations of the divine nature and power they have no end external to themselves, since their being is actualized in the maintenance and development of their own natures, albeit also in the service of all other things in the pursuit of like ends.

CAUSATION AS SELF-EXPRESSION OF THE ETERNAL REALITY

"God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity, and to eternity will remain in the same actuality."[3] "By eternity I understand existence itself, so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing. Such existence cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration be conceived as without beginning or end."[4] "It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity."[5] "We feel and know (or experience) that we are eternal."[6]

[1] I, Append.; cf. Prop. 33, Schol. 2 *fin.* [2] Ibid.; cf. IV, Pref.

[3] I, 17, Schol., where the necessity with which things follow from the existence and nature of God is illustrated by reference to "necessary" or "eternal" truth.

[4] I, Def. 8 and Expl. [5] II, 44, Corol. 2. [6] V, 23, Schol.

The various aspects of Spinoza's doctrine of causation, when taken together, give the fundamental principle indicated by the above citations. That God's causality is immanent causality, that it is alike free and necessary, and that it has no external purpose signify that the causality concerned is the self-expression of the ultimate reality, or *causa sui*, as the eternal ground of all existence. Such causality must be conceived after the fashion or on the analogy of necessary truth, or of the relation of ground and consequent rather than temporal succession.[1] It implies an order or sequence of which relations in time are only the symbol or outward semblance.[2] The fundamental order in terms of which the relations of things must ultimately be understood is that of different essences or individual natures and different levels of existence as determinate expressions of the being and nature of God.[3]

Spinoza's doctrine seems at first sight to be altogether incompatible with the reality in any sense of time or duration.[4] But the distinction of eternity as the character of true reality from mere everlastingness or endurance throughout all time does not imply timelessness in the sense of being that is out of all relation to time. It means rather that eternity is the *truth* of time, as freedom is of necessity or as spirit is of nature or matter. Time or duration must be explained through the nature of eternity and not contrariwise. Duration may be defined as the process of change or transition from a lower to a higher or a higher to a lower degree of perfection, and it presupposes the eternal actuality of perfect being.[5]

Further, eternity or eternal life must be understood as a quality rather than a quantity of existence,[6] and as participated in by finite beings according as they rise above mere conditions of time and place. For eternity can have no meaning for us unless it can in some degree enter into our experience here and now. There are, indeed, experiences in life in which one feels that the moment is itself eternal, that

[1] Joachim points out that the categories of ground and consequent, cause and effect, whole and part are all inadequate to express the immanence of God in the universe (*The Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 118–19).

[2] Cf. Plato's definition of time as the "moving image of eternity."

[3] My statement in this section owes much to Prof. H. F. Hallett's article on "Spinoza's Conception of Eternity" in *Mind*, vol. xxxvii, N.S., No. 147. I have not at hand for reference his *Aeternitas* in which the subject is treated at length.

[4] Time is distinguishable from duration—which Spinoza defines as "the indefinite continuation of existence" (II, Def. 5)—as its measurement by means of a comparison of durations, or, as Aristotle puts it, "the numbering of motion"; though common usage tends to identify them.

[5] Cf. Aristotle's principle of the primacy of actuality, which I endeavoured to set forth in the article mentioned above.

[6] For Spinoza's opposition of eternity and duration in reference to the question of immortality, see V, 34, Schol.

eternity is *in* the experience in such wise that time and change can never make it really pass away. To see things thus "under the form of eternity," that is, as having, each in its own time and place, an eternal existence and significance, and to live in the spirit of such insight, is to possess something of the perfection and joy of true being.

THE *NISUS* TOWARDS PERFECTION OR SELF-REALIZATION

"Each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being." "The effort by which each thing so endeavours is nothing but the actual essence (or nature) of the thing itself."[1] "Desire is the very essence of man in so far as determined to any action by any affect whatsoever." "Joy is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection."[2] "The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, but the passions depend alone upon those which are inadequate."[3]

As already said, the principle of differentiation along with the unity of reality is expressed, in Spinoza's philosophy, more especially in terms of the self-maintaining or self-realizing impulse (*conatus in suo esse perseverare*). It has also been noted that it belongs inherently to the finite and imperfect to aim at a goal or ideal beyond actual attainment. The essential character, therefore, of the finite—in its quest of the infinite and perfect, which is at the same time the presence of the infinite in it—is found in striving, endeavour, or desire. Desire, being the impulse to satisfy a want or need, is essentially for self-fulfilment. Such desire or aspiration is the efficient cause whereby the end or ideal goal is in any measure realized. Here, therefore, efficient and final cause are one.

Further, the sense or feeling of attainment is experienced as joy or happiness, which is the sign of upward as against downward tendency. In general, any affect or emotion ceases to be a mere passion and becomes action in proportion as it is controlled or sublimated through the power of adequate ideas, more particularly a true knowledge of oneself and of the causes of the emotions. Herein lies the road from bondage to liberty, and thereby to participation in some small measure in the blessedness of God. This impulse in virtue of which the finite individual aspires to its own perfection is, indeed, the self-affirmation of God in us, and is at once the affirmation of the individual self as a unique expression of the infinite divine nature and its negation as a self-centred or self-sufficient unit.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD

"Whatever we apprehend by 'intuitive knowledge' brings us the greatest satisfaction of mind (or acquiescence), and so the greatest

[1] III, 6 and 7.
[2] Ibid., Definitions of the Affects or Emotions. [3] Prop. 3.

joy, accompanied with the idea of God as its cause. . . . From this kind of knowledge, therefore, necessarily springs the intellectual love of God."[1] "He who loves God cannot seek that God should love him in return."[2] "The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself. . . . Hence the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same thing."[3]

These propositions must suffice to indicate the significance of the culminating phase of Spinoza's philosophy. According to his distinction of different kinds or stages of knowledge,[4] as the mind rises from the mere particulars of time and circumstance as apprehended in sense-perception and memory (*imaginatio*) through the universals of thought or reason (*ratio*) to what he calls intuitive knowledge (*scientia intuitiva*), that is, an intellectual intuition or insight which apprehends particular things and events in all their concrete reality as features of the universal order and therefore as necessarily following from the being and nature of God, it comes to acquiesce in that order not merely as the only possible one but also as an order of love. For, rightly apprehended, it is such as reveals a being that is at once supremely powerful and supremely wise and good, and so meets all the needs of the human spirit. This, then, is that "infinite and eternal object"[5] in the contemplation of which the mind is alone filled with a love that yields lasting joy and happiness.

Putting together the several strands of Spinoza's philosophy one sees that, whatever may be its deficiencies of logic and method, its essential import is not in doubt. What it teaches is that it is of the very nature of an infinite and perfect being to be manifested in finite individuals who can seek and find their true good in union with their immanent cause and end—a union which is at the same time that of each with all. This relation of the finite and the infinite implies that the divine activity creating, sustaining and controlling all things is not that of mere external power and compulsion but rather the inspiring and persuasive power of infinite love. The response of the finite individual has at its highest level the character of a rationally grounded and disinterested "love towards God" as the supreme reality made manifest in the whole universe of being. Thus the movement or process of the finite towards the infinite and the boundless self-giving of the infinite to the finite are one and the same fact. As the theologian expresses it, "Our opening and His entering are one moment."

[1] V, 32 and Corol. [2] Ibid., Prop. 19. [3] Prop. 36 and Corol.
[4] II, 40, Schol. 2. [5] *De Int. Emend.*, I, 10.

NATURE'S EDUCATION OF MAN

SOME REMARKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORDSWORTH

C. CLARKE.

THE essence of Wordsworth's creed appears, at first glance, to be simple and unambiguous: if we train the eye and ear to become receptive to the influence of natural objects, we come in time to receive "authentic tidings of invisible things," intuitive knowledge of a Spirit which informs both Nature and the mind of man. This Spirit is a source of spiritual power; communion with it brings serenity and joy. But for all the apparent simplicity of this creed, we are soon forced to ask difficult questions about it. For example, how, precisely, are we to conceive of this universal Spirit? It is "a motion and a spirit" which informs all things; but what else is it? If it can elevate the thoughts of man, is it itself possessed of moral attributes? Is it, for instance, a Spirit of Love? In order to understand more precisely how Wordsworth believed the Spirit, particularly as it manifested itself in the works of Nature, could influence and shape the mind of man, it will be necessary to turn chiefly to *The Prelude* and, by reference to it, to endeavour to answer the following questions:

(1) What, besides motion and infinitude, did Wordsworth consider the properties of the Universal Spirit to be?
(2) How did he believe man acquires knowledge of it? And
(3) In what precise sense did he maintain that Nature can educate man morally?

All quotations from *The Prelude*, unless otherwise stated, will be drawn from the 1805–6 version of the poem. The conclusions arrived at in this essay are not substantially affected by the changes in Wordsworth's philosophy which began to manifest themselves after this date. In one or two instances, however, a brief consideration of these changes will be necessary.

I

The first question is the most difficult to answer. Again and again Wordsworth tried to translate his vivid awareness of the actual concrete presence of the Spirit into language that was equally vivid and concrete. The language in which he describes the Spirit and its workings is therefore often highly metaphorical. So it is misleading at

times to take his statements quite at their face value. All statements about a universal Spirit (or any spirit) must be metaphorical; but there are degrees of anthropomorphism in metaphor and sometimes Wordsworth uses metaphors of a more animistic character than at others. It will be necessary to bear in mind this difference in kinds, or levels, of metaphor if we are to determine what are the essential attributes of the Spirit. Wordsworth himself complained that some failed to do this when reading his Ode, *Intimations of Immortality*. In the Fenwick note to the Ode Wordsworth denies that he meant to inculcate a belief in the pre-existence of souls: "I took hold of the notion of pre-existence as having sufficient foundation in humanity for authorizing me to make for my purpose the best use of it I could as a poet," namely, to express the vividness, dream-like splendour and visionary qualities of the child's sensations. In the same way, Wordsworth sometimes makes relatively direct statements about the Universal Spirit while at other times he is content to shadow forth its nature in terms of animistic metaphor.

The first property which Wordsworth quite unambiguously attributes to the whole universe is life:

> . . . in all things now
> I saw one life and felt that it was joy.[1]

There is not only universal motion, but there is universal life. Furthermore, the Spirit is eternal; it is the one in the many. In "the press of self-destroying, transitory things" it abides,

> The Soul of Beauty and enduring life . . .[2]

From this point we begin to tread more doubtful ground. For instance, Wordsworth frequently refers to the "liberty" and the "power" of things. Frequently, of course, he speaks of the spiritual power which comes to the lover of Nature. But it is clear that he considers the concept of power to have a much wider connotation than this. Power is not merely an idea, or a spiritual condition, the effect of the impact of Nature on the human mind; "ever-during power"[3] is itself a property of the universal spirit. It is the positive, active quality of things by which they influence and dominate other things. It is energy conceived of poetically.

Of the positive influence of books, he writes that he will

> . . . speak of them as Powers
> For ever to be hallowed; only less,
> For what we may become, and what we need,
> Than Nature's self, which is the breath of God.[4]

The mind may be influenced, in a particularly imperative way, by the power of mountains. Mountains are to Wordsworth obvious

[1] *The Prelude*, II, 429–30.
[2] Ibid., VII, 736.
[3] *The Excursion*, IV, 1143.
[4] *The Prelude*, V, 219–22.

and striking manifestations of power; they envelop and hang over the habitations of men as a brooding presence. For the human mind is as responsive to emanations of power as all other things in the universe. Indeed much more so. The mind is certainly no exception to the universal law that each thing "feels" emissions of power from the other things which surround it. The mountain's presence

> . . . shapes
> The measure and the prospect of the soul
> To majesty. . . .[1]

The concept of power is intimately related to the concept of liberty. For example, the imagination of man, his power to "half create"[2] sensations, only develops when he is free from enslavement to the despotic bodily eye and the other senses. During childhood and youth the mind is held "in absolute dominion"[3] by the senses. But as the power of imagination develops, it frees the mind and makes both the senses, and the objects with which the senses deal,

> . . . subservient in their turn
> To the great ends of Liberty and Power.[4]

Both the concepts "liberty" and "power" are embraced within the even more important concept of "imagination." Imagination is at once the liberty *and* the power of things. In the final book he says of imagination that it "alone is genuine liberty."[5] Imagination is a property of the universe as a whole. It is the creative principle in all things, the power which creates a unity out of a given multiplicity. Wordsworth conceived of all things as, in varying degrees, creative. Perception is regarded, not as a purely human activity, but as a process which has its equivalents throughout the whole of Nature. In the lines prefaced to *The Excursion* he announces that in the proposed philosophical poem *The Recluse* his theme will be how exquisitely the human mind and the external world are fitted to each other; he will write of

> . . . the creation (by no lower name
> Can it be called) which they with blended might
> Accomplish. . . .

This power to create is the greatest virtue that a thing can possess.[6] In the celebrated passages on imagination in the final book, Wordsworth makes it quite clear that imagination in Nature is identical in kind with the imagination which is present in man,[7] and pre-eminently so in higher minds. Moreover, the relationship of "mutual

[1] *The Prelude*, VII, 723–5.
[2] *Lines composed above Tintern Abbey*, I, 106.
[3] *The Prelude*, XI, 176.
[4] Ibid., XI, 183–4.
[5] Ibid., XIII, 122.
[6] Ibid., XII, 378–9.
[7] Ibid., XIII, 84–92.

domination"[1] or "interchangeable supremacy"[1] which exists between all things is not an external one. There is an interpenetration of all things in the universe, an interfusion of all the parts in an organic whole. He records a moment of supreme intuition when he felt all things

> Were half confounded in each other's blaze,
> One galaxy of life and joy.[2]

Nothing exists independently, for everything is informed by the one Spirit.

It is because the Spirit is the Spirit of God that its operations are so highly integrated, "like the workings of one mind."[3] In the introduction to his edition of *The Prelude*, de Selincourt writes: "In the highest mood of ecstasy, (Wordsworth's) consciousness of complete oneness with God is so overwhelming, that his other attributes as man seem to fall from him, and he knows only that

> one interior life
> In which all beings live with God, themselves
> Are God. . . . "

and in the note to lines 220–4, Book II, he writes, that an essential feature of this mystical experience is "the sense that God in Nature is one with God in the soul, so that the soul seems to *be* God or *be* Nature." The lines quoted immediately above appear in a notebook, but not in any completed poem of Wordsworth's. They do justice to the immanence of God in the universe, but not to his transcendence of it. Wordsworth appears to have conceived of God as a Being who both transcended the universe and also breathed a Spirit of life and creativeness into it, and particularly into the mind of man. The Spirit is "Nature's self, which is the breath of God."[4] In a later book the metaphor from breathing is repeated.

> . . . Great God!
> Who send'st thyself into this breathing world
> Through Nature and through every kind of life,
> And mak'st man what he is, Creature divine. . . .[5]

God sends himself into the breathing world; that is, he sends his breath into the world. Nature and man are divine because they are inspired (in the etymological sense of the word) by this divine breath. Indeed, they *are* God's breath, because the breath is their essence. Wordsworth was, of course, emphatically opposed to the idea that Nature and man stand over against God as things which he has made, as a watchmaker makes a watch. But because he repudiated this view he was not therefore committed to pantheism. De Selincourt

[1] See *The Prelude*, 1850 version, XIV, 81–4.
[2] Ibid., VIII, 629–30.
[3] Ibid., VI, 568.
[4] Ibid., V, 222.
[5] Ibid., X, 386–9.

points out how several lines are altered by Wordsworth, in the 1850 version, "to cover up the traces of his early pantheism." For example, the line

> God and nature's single sovereignty[1]

becomes

> Presences of God's mysterious power
> Made manifest in Nature's sovereignty.

But it is not clear that the line quoted here from the 1805 version is a completely accurate expression of Wordsworth's faith at that time. It needs to be balanced, or augmented, by other lines from the 1805 Prelude, such as those already quoted (X, 386–9), which do more justice to the transcendence of God. "All beings live with God, themselves are God" because God is the soul of Nature. Without him it would be as a carcase. Nature is therefore different, and yet not different, from God. It is allowable to speak of "God and nature's single sovereignty." And yet this is only a partial expression of the truth, for God also transcends Nature.

It may be safely asserted, then, that Wordsworth attributed to the universal Spirit the properties of movement, infinity, life, eternal endurance, power and liberty (or imagination), and unity. And, finally, he felt the Spirit to be divine. When he speaks of the power or the liberty of things, he means such metaphors to be taken seriously. What it means to take a Wordsworthian metaphor seriously may be illustrated from the following passage:

> For me, when my affections first were led
> From kindred, friends, and playmates, to partake
> Love for the human creature's absolute self,
> That noticeable kindliness of heart
> Sprang out of fountains.[2]

Wordsworth is not merely saying here that fountains spring up spontaneously and give themselves freely *as though* they were kind, and that he drew a lesson from this appearance of kindliness and applied it in the field of human action. The metaphor is no such tame and commonplace thing. The language is direct, unequivocal and compelling. It demands to be taken seriously. Wordsworth is saying that his own kindliness of heart sprang out of fountains. The fountains are themselves kindly, and the kindliness of fountains and the kindliness of the human heart is one thing. He is expressing his intuitive awareness of the upsurging, creative and loving spirit that is in all things.

But though we take this metaphor seriously we are not required, as a consequence, to take *all* the "human" meaning associated with

[1] *The Prelude*, IX, 237.

[2] Ibid., 1850 version, VIII, 121–5.

the phrase "kindliness of heart" and apply it in the case of fountains. A kindly heart is kindly disposed towards someone, and the "love" in the lines quoted above is directed towards "the human creature's absolute self." Is the kindliness of the fountains also directed towards something? Is the universal Spirit a loving Spirit in a fully anthropomorphic sense? In the early books of *The Prelude* there is no mention of universal love, but only of the mother's love. We learn that the universal Spirit is a joyously assertive Spirit; it is glad, spontaneous, creative and powerful. Joy, and not love, is the characteristic word. But towards the end of the poem the emphasis alters; we find Wordsworth writing of the "pervading love"[1] in all creatures, of love in Nature and of the "tender ways"[1] of the lamb and the lamb's mother. But what is this "pervading love" directed towards? The difficulty here is that the verb "love" is transitive. When Wordsworth writes of the unutterable love on the face of the clouds,[2] he is not speaking, in an orthodox way, of a God who loves humanity, but rather of a God who loves—what? presumably to create and to contemplate his creation. The highest sort of love, the pure spiritual love of God, is inseparably linked with creation. It neither acts "nor can exist without Imagination."[3] Here we recognize the familiar theological notion that God creates because he loves. But *what* He loves is—creating. We hear echoes here of Spinoza's Intellectual Love of God, which is that reflexive love of God whereby God loves himself. The fountain's loving and joyous flow is God loving himself, and the love of the clouds is not directed towards man.

It is more difficult to determine the meaning of some of the basic Wordsworthian metaphors than of others. The metaphors of love and joy are particularly difficult. In what sense can joy be considered a property of the universal Spirit? How are we to understand the line:

I saw one life and felt that it was joy[4] . . . ?

or how interpret the statement that "every flower enjoys the air it breathes"? Though the metaphor here is a highly anthropomorphic one, it does not follow that there is not some real sense in which it has a universal applicability. The human experience of enjoyment may have its equivalents in the natural world. One is reminded of the use of the word "enjoyment" in the metaphysics of Samuel Alexander.

Indeed, in endeavouring to shadow forth the nature of the universal Spirit, Wordsworth fell very easily and very frequently into the language of animism. De Selincourt writes (in the note to lines 351–72, Book I): "It is interesting to notice that when Words-

[1] *The Prelude*, XIII, 149–56.
[2] *The Excursion*, I, 203–5.
[3] *The Prelude*, 1850 version, XIV, 188–9.
[4] Ibid., II, 430.

worth began to write *The Prelude* he still delighted to conceive of Nature not merely as the expression of one divine spirit, but as in its several parts animated by individual spirits who had, like human beings, an independent life and power of action. This was obviously his firm belief in the primitive paganism of his boyhood and long after he had given up definite belief in it he cherished it as a more than poetic fancy." In the book on childhood there are two obvious examples of this primitivism. There are the lines in which he describes how he stole trapped woodcocks and heard

> Low breathings coming after me, and sounds
> Of undistinguishable motion, steps
> Almost as silent as the turf they trod.[1]

And there is the episode of the stolen boat.[2] But such language is not confined to the first book. In the later books which tell of the experiences of youth and manhood traces of the early paganism are still visible. When he is describing his experience in the Simplon Pass, he tells how waterfalls, rocks and winds all seemed to him "like workings of one mind." Yet in this very passage where he is recording an intuition of the unity of the Spirit, he drops for two or three lines into language which bears the unmistakable marks of a more primitive belief:

> The rocks that mutter'd close upon our ears,
> Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side
> As if a voice were in them. . . .[3]

We are reminded here of the Fenwick note on the Ode, *Intimations*, which has been already quoted. The notion that rocks mutter, like the notion of pre-existence, has sufficient foundation in humanity for authorizing Wordsworth to make for his purpose the best use he can of it as a poet. The result is a sort of animism, but again it cannot be negligently dismissed as "mere" animism. The basic ideas of the life, mutual domination and interpenetration of all things are here being expressed in terms of a very appropriate myth. All the separate ideas of universal life, power and so on are compositely and concretely felt when we read of crags that speak by the wayside. The intimate interpenetration of things is suggested by "the rocks that mutter'd close upon our ears." The low breathings that came after the poet as a child were not, it is true, the breathings of an individual spirit, but nor were they entirely unreal. They were a manifestation of the intimate domination of the mind by Nature.

The basic Wordsworthian metaphors, such as power and liberty, are drawn from the sphere of human mental activity and invested with a less restricted and grander significance. In the new universe of discourse they shed many of their distinctively human associations.

[1] *The Prelude*, I, 330–2. [2] Ibid., I, 409–12. [3] Ibid., VI, 562–4.

We have been trying to distinguish these metaphors from those such as "love," which retain many of their human associations even in their new setting—and are intended to do so. Any endeavour to determine what properties may actually be ascribed to the universal Spirit soon resolves itself into an attempt to distinguish these two sorts of metaphor, or, more often, into an attempt (with the example of such a metaphor as pre-existence in mind) to determine how much of a given metaphor is to be interpreted "unmetaphorically," and how much is to be regarded as a poetic device for suggesting vividly the nature of the basic reality. Power and liberty may be regarded as typical instances of real attributes of the Spirit; and "kindliness of heart" and "love," in the transitive, human sense, as instances of anthropomorphic attributes, though it is necessary to remember that there is a sense in which all the attributes may be considered anthropomorphic, and that the one class shades into the other. The "joyfulness" of the sea is a metaphor which falls somewhere between the two classes.

So, in the context of Wordsworth's poetry, the archaic animism implicit in some of the dead metaphors of everyday language acquires an unexpected and startling significance. When he writes of the grandeur or solemnity of the hills, he is expressing "a more than poetic fancy."

II

The Prelude is the record of the "Growth of a Poet's Mind." One aspect of that growth is the evolution of the poet's conception of the universal Spirit. In boyhood he conceives of it animistically; as he matures this conception is gradually refined. This evolution corresponds with a development in the actual process of knowing. Wordsworth believed that there are two ways of knowing—by association of ideas, and by intuition. The theory of the association of ideas was peculiarly attractive to him, and there appears to have been a period in his life, corresponding perhaps with the period in which he was most under the influence of Godwinian intellectualism, when he believed that the theory explained completely how the human mind acquires knowledge. His kinship with Hartley and English sensationalism has been thoroughly established by Professor Beatty in his study *William Wordsworth: His Mind and Art.* Wordsworth was greatly attracted by the theory that sensations are the very stuff out of which the moral life is built; indeed this was in large measure his own faith. Hartley had methodically traced such a connection between sensations and character, and had endeavoured to show that the whole fabric of man's intellectual and moral life is built up by one single process, the association, into increasingly com-

plex systems, of simple ideas, or sensations. But this theory could not for long hold Wordsworth's complete allegiance, for it could not explain, and it allowed no place to, those direct intuitions of reality which visited him more and more frequently as he approached manhood. De Selincourt has remarked that for Wordsworth "there was always this great paradox, that though it is simply by the proper exercise of eye and ear that man reaches his full moral and intellectual stature, yet revelation flashes upon him when "the light of sense goes out" and "laid asleep in body," he becomes deeply conscious of the presence of God within him." Wordsworth makes the difference between these two ways of knowing clear in a number of passages. It is important to realize this because there is at least one critic, namely Professor Beatty, who maintains that Wordsworth remained a strict associationist to his last days. But this is not borne out by the evidence of his autobiographical poem. Even the tempestuous enjoyments of his childhood were illumined occasionally by "gleams like the flashing of a shield,"[1] rare flashes of intuitive insight which had nothing to do with an association of ideas. In the second book he makes the distinction between the two ways of knowing quite explicit:

> My seventeenth year was come
> And, whether . . .
> To unorganic natures I transferr'd
> My own enjoyments, or, the power of truth
> Coming in revelation, I convers'd
> With things that really are, I, at this time
> Saw blessings spread around me like a sea.[2]

The mind of the child arrives at an animistic conception of Nature because its knowledge is, with the exception of occasional "gleams," gained by the association of ideas; insight into the real nature of the universal Spirit mostly comes later and is achieved through intuition. But such intuition is only possible to the mind which has been disciplined to receive it by "the proper exercise of eye and ear." Indeed it would be wrong to imagine that, because the two ways of knowing are antithetical, there is therefore a fundamental antagonism between them. The object of the one knowing process is different from that of the other. The object of knowledge through association of ideas is Nature, in the sense of the world of natural objects; the object of intuitive insight is Nature in the sense of an ultimate, non-visible Reality. (Wordsworth uses the word in both senses.) The worship of Nature, that is, the world of natural objects, is not an end in itself. It is to be valued because it leads to that higher sort of knowing by which 'we see into the life of things.'[3] Such insight, however, only

[1] *The Prelude*, I, 614.
[2] Ibid., II, 405–14.
[3] *Lines composed above Tintern Abbey*, I, 49.

came to Wordsworth because he had first learned to love Nature. And it is through an association of ideas that such love develops. Sensations from the world of natural beauty are associated in infancy with love for the mother and also, in childhood, with the pleasurable organic sensations which accompany physical activity. The beauty of Nature is at this stage valued only secondarily, because it is associated with animal pleasures and sports. The association of beauty with pleasure is, however, to be a lifelong possession. In those hours of childhood when "from excess of happiness" the blood appears "to flow with its own pleasure,"[1] a scene of natural beauty, such as the setting of the sun, has a peculiar power to disturb the boy. For he is receiving sensations of colour and form from Nature at the same time that he is most aware of the exuberant life within him. As a consequence, the "internal" pleasure is transferred to, or comes to be associated with, the object of perception in the world of Nature. So there comes a time when the setting of the sun can act alone as a primary stimulus to pleasure and can set in motion, in mind and body, a complex system of ideas, feelings and sensations. Included in this system are those sensations of joyful organic activity which have so often accompanied his perception of a sunset. So the child comes to have premonitions of the truth that there is a joyful life in the sun as there is a joyful life in his own body.

But how can it be proved that this is truth? Does not mere animal vitality cast an illusion over life? Because a healthy boy feels very much alive, are we to believe that all nature is alive with him? Wordsworth was not unaware of this problem. The lines quoted above (whether . . . to unorganic natures I transferr'd my own enjoyments) tend to suggest that he regarded "knowledge" gained by the association of ideas as having a doubtful validity, and that there is a sharp distinction between such "knowledge" (or opinion), and knowledge gained by intuition, since the one projects qualities into Nature and the other discovers them there. But this was not, in fact, Wordsworth's belief. He certainly believed that Fancy—particularly the Fancy of the adolescent—could read into Nature much that was not there. But it was also his deep conviction that animistic fancies were, most often, the crude expression of important truths. We have already noticed that he refined the language of animism and made use of it to communicate his own intuitions. In fact, Wordsworth was not seriously troubled by the philosophical doubt that he might have been transferring his own enjoyments into "unorganic natures." He was not, like Coleridge, racked by the thought that

> we receive but what we give
> And in our life alone does Nature live.

[1] *The Prelude*, II, 191–3.

His answer to such a doubt was that he did "transfer his enjoyments" as a child but that his later intuitions proved he had not been deceived by Nature in doing this. The wild impulses of the child had proved essentially trustworthy. He believed that the impulses of the child and the intuitions of the man were both reliable. The intuitions proved the impulses to be reliable, and the intuitions were reliable because they were intuitions, and because Nature is good and does not deceive. This is his natural piety, his faith that

> Nature never did betray
> The heart that loved her.[1]

So we find him writing of

> Emotion which best foresight need not fear,[2]
> Most worthy then of trust when most intense.

There is fresh evidence here of the importance to Wordsworth of the basic concepts of Liberty and Imagination. The development of man in moral stature depends on the free, imaginative, assertion of his emotional life, in accordance with Nature and the vital, expansive Spirit in all things. He was very soon, in the *Ode to Duty*, to repudiate this romantic ethic, and even in the last book of *The Prelude* itself he voices a doubt about it. The impulsive affirmations of Nature are not, perhaps, always good and trustworthy. It is necessary to keep

> In wholesome separation the two natures
> The one that feels, the other that observes.[3]

In *The Prelude* as a whole, however, no such reservations are made. Natural impulses are there regarded as completely trustworthy and as the ultimate source of all knowledge. They bring authentic tidings of Reality.

III

We have examined Wordsworth's beliefs concerning the nature of Reality and the knowing mind, that is, his beliefs concerning the properties of the universal Spirit and how man acquires knowledge of it. We are now in a position to consider the final question, how Nature, informed by this Spirit, can not only supply man with knowledge, but also contribute to his moral education. There are two questions involved here: first, how can communing with Nature have any moral effect on us at all, and second, how, in particular, can it teach us to love man?

In his notes to his edition of Wordsworth, William Knight poohpoohed the idea that people who live in beautiful natural surround-

[1] *Lines composed above Tintern Abbey*, I, 122–3.
[2] *The Prelude*, XIII, 115–17.
[3] Ibid., 330–1.

ings are any more moral than people who do not. But Wordsworth did not claim that education against a background of Nature was the *only* way of developing morally. In Book VII on his Residence in London, he writes of the bewildering multiplicity of sights in the city. It is difficult for the human mind to grasp and master such diversity. But it is not bewildering to all minds:

> It is not wholly so to him who looks
> In steadiness, who hath among least things
> An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts
> As parts, but with a feeling of the whole.
> This, of all acquisitions first, awaits
> On sundry and most widely different modes
> Of education; nor with least delight
> On that through which I pass'd.[1]

And secondly, it is not natural beauty, unaided, which Wordsworth considered a great moral educator. It is natural beauty in alliance with other sources of power—and chiefly books, and the sturdy, simple life of the dalesmen. He is aware that sensitive souls who have been brought up in surroundings of natural beauty are liable to develop a deep appreciation of poetry. But he is also aware that reading poetry will make them more able to appreciate natural beauty:

> Visionary Power
> Attends upon the motions of the winds
> Embodied in the mystery of words.[2]

It is the *association* of natural beauty with human virtue which he considered so valuable an educational force. This is particularly clear in the passage on admiration and love from the notebook *Y* which de Selincourt has published, and in the passage in Book II on the mental development of the baby. The baby sees love in the mother's eye and holds "mute dialogues" with her heart. Because it is loved it learns to love in return, and by association learns to love, in addition, all the sensations in the mother's environment. Thus from birth love and sensation, virtue and beauty, are indissolubly connected. Indeed, love acts as an actual synthesizing principle in perception. Of the baby and the mother's love for it, he writes:

> Such feelings pass into his torpid life
> Like an awakening breeze, and hence his mind
> Even in the first trial of its powers
> Is prompt and watchful, eager to combine
> In one appearance, all the elements
> And parts of the same object, else detach'd
> And loth to coalesce. Thus, day by day,
> Subjected to the discipline of love,

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[1] *The Prelude*, VII, 709–15.

[2] Ibid., V, 619–21.

His organs and recipient faculties
Are quicken'd, are more vigorous, his mind spreads,
Tenacious of the forms which it receives.[1]

and again, of the mother:

From this beloved Presence, there exists
A virtue which irradiates and exalts
All objects through all intercourse of sense.[2]

That is why perception is described, on more than one occasion, as a process of creation as well as of receiving.[3] A human being loves sensations from birth; he seizes them; he goes half-way to meet them; he orders and synthesizes them. And when the source of love is removed (as in Wordsworth's case by the death of both parents) the association of love and beauty remains, because it has become an established habit.

The next step is the widening of this association to include others beyond the circle of family and playfellows. Man is first seen against the background of Nature in the persons of the simple, virtuous shepherd class. So again an important association is formed. Love of Nature leads gradually to love of the noble men associated with Nature.

But along with this moral development in accordance with the principle of association, and tending to supersede it, there goes a different sort of education which has affinities with the second way of knowing, namely the intuitive. And here we reach that part of Wordsworth's teaching which is most familiar. He maintained that those whose sensory responses are not deadened by habit but are vitalized by imagination (whose function it is to create and to counteract the tendency of things to mechanically repeat the past), may draw spiritual power from Nature by merely being in her presence. No principle of association is involved to explain how this occurs. Nature stamps her impressions directly on the mind of man and thereby chastens, subdues and strengthens him. But bearing Knight's criticism in mind, it is important to remember that this effect is not automatic simply because it is direct. It operates only on those who predispose themselves to receive it, who break the bonds of habit and sense with a wise passiveness. The compelling immediacy of the imprint is conveyed in the following lines:

Oh! then the calm
And dead still water lay upon my mind
Even with a weight of pleasure, and the sky
Never before so beautiful, sank down
Into my heart, and held me like a dream.[4]

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[1] *The Prelude*, II, 244–54. [2] Ibid., 258–60.
[3] *Lines composed above Tintern Abbey*, I, 105–7. [4] *The Prelude*, II, 176–80.

The water lies directly on the mind and tranquillizes it. And again:

> By influence habitual to the mind
> The mountain's outline and its steady form
> Gives a pure grandeur, and its presence shapes
> The measure and the prospect of the soul
> To majesty. . . .[1]

The influence here is habitual but, though habitual, it does not operate through the association of ideas. Rather it is by the constant repetition of unnoticed, but direct, impulses. The mountain, directly and immediately, gives its grandeur and shapes the soul. The mountain can communicate its power to the human mind in the same way that any natural object can influence or dominate another—in the same way, for instance, that a river flows into and enriches the sea. There is no special problem about the way in which Nature can directly influence the human mind, though the susceptibility of human minds to such influence varies greatly.

These direct impulses from natural objects have affinities with the highest type of mystical intuition, and yet they are clearly different. For these experiences are not the occasions when "the light of sense goes out," though they are the forerunners of such occasions. This type of direct moral education through incipiently mystical experiences, is related also to moral education through the association of ideas, that is, through the association of love and beauty. In fact it is only those objects which the child has learned to love through an association of ideas which are capable later of striking upon his mind with the impact of revelation. The child learns to love the object in a general way and, thus predisposed, he comes to receive direct impulses from Nature which, though often marginal and subtle, have a most powerful moral effect, for they are harbingers of the highest type of intuition. In a passage which he abridged in the 1850 version, Wordsworth explains how this occurs:

> All that I beheld
> Was dear to me, and from this cause it came,
> That now to Nature's finer influxes
> My mind lay open, to that more exact
> And intimate communion which our hearts
> Maintain with the minuter properties
> Of objects which already are belov'd,
> And of those only.[2]

This moral education through direct impulses from Nature leads eventually to intuition in the highest sense. Such intuition brings with it a love of man—not the love of one class of men only, but of all men. Wordsworth had learned as a child to love the humble shepherd class because of their virtue and because their virtue was

[1] *The Prelude*, VII, 721–5.

[2] Ibid., II, 296–303.

associated with the beauty of Nature. But the love of man which springs from direct communion with the Spirit is universal, because the Spirit itself is universal. When Wordsworth has realized that human nature is part of a universal Spirit far diffused through time and space, man assumes a new dignity and he himself achieves a new serenity.[1] This supreme intuition of the unity of all things is the source of his moral strength and the climax of his education through Nature.

[1] *The Prelude*, VII, 760–8.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BISHOP BUTLER'S ETHICS

THOMAS H. McPHERSON, M.A.

PART I

I

THE aim of this article is to show that there are two distinct ethical theories in the writings of Bishop Butler. This is something that his critics do not seem to have realized. One or two of them have seen that the Dissertation on Virtue contains ideas which do not harmonize very well with those of the *Rolls Sermons*, but no one has made a detailed study of the differences. It has been usual to dismiss them with the remark that Butler is an inconsistent writer and we should not worry too much over details.

It is true that Butler is an inconsistent writer, but he becomes much less inconsistent when his two great works on ethics are considered separately, and the differences between them are seen to represent a natural development in his thought.

Butler's ethical theory, then, is two-sided. His critics seem also to fall into two groups. First, there are those who apparently have seen only one side, and have offered that as "the real Butler." Secondly, there are those who have seen both sides and have either accused him of inconsistency and left it at that, or else have made heroic but hopeless attempts to reconcile his contradictory statements.

We give some examples of the conflicting interpretations of Butler which his critics have offered.

Among critics of the first class, Dr. Joad[1] complains that the great fault in Butler is that he refuses to take actual consequences into account in judging of the rightness of an act. On the other hand, Professor Prichard[2] attacks him for making the rightness of an act depend on its ability to produce happiness for the agent—which clearly involves reference to consequences. Both Dr. Joad and Professor Prichard are right, in the sense that there are passages in Butler which support both views. But one is basing his criticism on the *Analogy* doctrine, and the other is basing his on the *Sermons* doctrine; both apparently considering that the one they have chosen represents the whole of what Butler thought about ethics. Perhaps

[1] C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, Chapter VIII.

[2] H. A. Prichard, "Duty and Interest," *passim*, and "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (*Mind*, 1912, p. 22).

this may not be altogether just to Professor Prichard and Dr. Joad. They may be well aware that Butler has two ethical theories, and not one; but they have not said so, and they can only be judged on the basis of what they have said.

Of the second class, we may mention as a typical example of those critics who have noticed the inconsistencies but have merely deplored them, Professor Muirhead,[1] who writes: "Butler, whose psychology is much in advance of his time, rightly perceives that affections ought not to be distinguished as selfish and unselfish, or made the object of moral judgment in any proper sense at all apart from the objects (wealth, power, happiness of others, etc.) to which they attach and which give them their moral quality. On the other hand, he fails to maintain the intuitional point of view throughout, and even admits that the suggestions of reasonable self-love, which takes into account the rewards decreed by the Deity in a future life for those who keep His revealed commandments, may be accepted as a working substitute for the voice of conscience."

The other group of critics belonging to the second class contains the names of most of those who have written about Butler's ethics. For example, Professor C. D. Broad,[2] Professor A. E. Taylor,[3] and Selby-Bigge[4] attempt to explain away the inconsistencies and to pack everything in Butler into one system, showing considerable ingenuity in fitting in the more recalcitrant passages.

But Butler's critics have not made enough of the fact that there were ten years between the publication of his two great works. It is surely reasonable to allow that he may have changed his mind during those years. An examination of the two works will show that while they contain some slight internal inconsistencies, the great differences of view are to be found when they are compared with each other. An attempt is made to demonstrate this in what follows. The obvious conclusion is that the later work represents a *development* in Butler's thought.

The works of Butler which contain his ethical theories are *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel* (1726), and *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (1736), to which latter work is appended a Dissertation on Virtue. These works will be referred to throughout the rest of this article as *Sermons* and *Analogy* respectively.

In the following section the ethical theory of the *Sermons* is outlined, and in Section III the same is done for the *Analogy*. Rather full use of quotation is made here, but it is hoped that it will not be

[1] J. H. Muirhead, *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 78.
[2] C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, Chapter III.
[3] A. E. Taylor, "Some Features of Butler's Ethics" (*Mind*, 1926).
[4] L. A. Selby-Bigge in the introduction to his *British Moralists*.

thought too full. I have felt it best to let Butler speak for himself as much as possible.

In Section IV, one or two passages in the *Sermons* which raise difficulties of interpretation are considered and an attempt is made to resolve the difficulties.

In the last section, first, a recapitulation of Butler's two theories is given, followed by a list of their similarities and differences; and then one or two general remarks are offered to close this account of the development of Bishop Butler's ethical theory.

II.

The *Sermons* is not completely free from inconsistencies; and that for a reason which Butler gives in the last paragraph of the Preface which he wrote for the second edition:

"It may be proper just to advertise the reader, that he is not to look for any particular reason for the choice of the greatest part of these Discourses; their being taken from amongst many others, preached in the same place, through a course of eight years, being in great measure accidental. Neither is he to expect to find any other connection between them, than that uniformity of thought and design, which will always be found in the writings of the same person, when he writes with simplicity and in earnest."[1]

Butler, in some passages in the *Sermons*, flatly contradicts what he says in others. It might be thought, then, that the fairest thing would be to take his ethics from the Preface, which has at least the advantage of being a considered literary work, and not a preached discourse; but even the Preface is not altogether consistent with itself; also it does not offer a complete enough picture of Butler's views. The outline which follows is based on both the Preface and the Sermons themselves; I think it may be fairly taken as representing what Butler was trying to say in the *Sermons*.

The basic thing in Butler's ethics is his notion of human nature. For Butler, as for the Stoics, to act virtuously is to act according to one's nature. The first three Sermons are "intended to explain what is meant by the nature of man, when it is said that virtue consists in following, and vice in deviating from it; and by explaining to shew that the assertion is true."[2]

Butler feels that to understand human nature it is not enough merely to know the parts of which it is made up; we also need to know the relations which hold between them. In the Preface, he draws an analogy between human nature and a watch. "Suppose the

[1] II, 25. All references to Butler's works are to Gladstone's edition, 1897. The Roman figure refers to the volume, and the Arabic to the page number; thus: I, 56 would mean Volume I, page 56. [2] II, 5.

several parts of [a watch] taken to pieces and placed apart from each other: let a man have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. . . . But let him form a notion of the relations which those several parts have to each other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch."[1] So with man. "It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the system or constitution of human nature. And from the idea itself it will as fully appear that this our nature, i.e. constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears, that its nature, i.e. constitution or system, is adapted to measure time."[2]

Thus, for Butler, human nature is adapted to virtue as a watch is to telling the time; with this important difference: "A machine is inanimate and passive: but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power. We are charged with it; and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it."[3] Accountable to whom? To God, undoubtedly; but Butler does not develop this point in the *Sermons*.

Butler, in the Preface, sketches the argument along these lines which he has given in the first three Sermons.[4]

Man has "instincts and principles of action" as other creatures have; some leading most directly to public, others to private good. Men, like the brutes, obey their "instincts and principles of action," according to the constitution of their bodies and the external circumstances they are in. The brutes, in acting thus, "act suitably to their whole nature." The same would be true of man, "if no more were to be said of man's nature than what has been now said; if that, as it is a true, were also a complete, adequate account of our nature." But it is not. For man, in addition to the "instincts and principles of action" which he shares with the brutes, has also the faculty of conscience or reflection, and it "plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest." No human being can be said to act in accordance with his true nature unless he allows conscience the absolute authority which is due to it. In Butler's view, "the very constitution of our nature requires that we bring our whole conduct before" the superior faculty of conscience; "wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it."

This, then, is Butler's idea of human nature: a hierarchy of principles, with conscience or reflection at the top. Let us examine in

[1] II, 7–8. [2] II, 8. [3] II, 9. [4] II, 10.

more detail what he has to say about the principles which make up human nature. In the quotations so far given (all from the Preface) he has grouped them into two classes: on the one hand, "instincts and principles of action," and, on the other, conscience. He treats the "instincts and principles of action" more fully in the Sermons themselves. In the First Sermon he classifies them under the following heads: (1) Particular affections ("several passions and affections") and appetites, (2) Benevolence, (3) Self-love. We shall examine each of these in turn.

The *appetites and affections* need little explanation. They are the natural human impulses or propensities. It may, however, be worthwhile to draw attention to a point which does not seem to have been noticed by commentators on Butler. Those who have written about Butler's "passions, affections, and appetites" have treated them as if Butler meant them as different names for the same thing.[1] But in fact, Butler does distinguish between these terms (though admittedly only in his use of them—he does not state explicitly the differences in their meanings). He says, for instance, "hunger is to be considered as a private appetite . . . desire of esteem is a public passion."[2] This is not merely a case of what H. W. Fowler would have called "elegant variation." Butler does not mean the same thing by "appetite" as he does by "passion." He does seem to use "passion" and "affection" as synonyms, but he always carefully distinguishes these on the one hand from "appetite" on the other. Some examples of affections or passions which he gives are: desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, indignation against successful vice, the love of our neighbour. Set against these is his example of an appetite, viz. hunger. It is difficult to know how to state the difference clearly, but it is undoubtedly there. Perhaps we might be permitted to say that "appetite" is used by Butler for a *bodily* impulse, and "passion or affection" for a *mental* one: e.g. sexual desire would be an appetite; love, in the Christian sense, a passion or affection.

Of the passions or affections, some tend more especially to private good, others more especially to public good. But none is to be called a purely private or a purely public affection. If we think of some affections as being in a special way conducive to private good, "this does not hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good."[3]

We pass next to consider Butler's treatment of *benevolence*. When he first introduces the notion he says, "There is a natural principle

[1] See e.g. C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 60; R. Jackson, "Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism" (art. in *Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, 1943), p. 116.

[2] II, 34, *footnote*. [3] II, 35.

of *benevolence* in man; which is in some degree to *society* what *self-love* is to the *individual.*"[1] But this is the only place where he does speak of it as a general principle, and even here, should we care to press the meaning of the words "in some degree," it would appear that he is not sure about it. He usually treats benevolence as if he thought it merely one among the many particular affections. A dozen or more passages might be quoted to show this, but one or two will suffice. "The chief design of the eleventh Discourse is to state the notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order to show that benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love, than any other particular affection whatever."[2] "All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification."[3] "Every particular affection, benevolence among the rest, is subservient to self-love, by being the instrument of private enjoyment."[4]

It has been usual for expositors of Butler's ethics (especially Professor Broad[5]) to speak as if Butler treated benevolence as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love, but in fact he does not do so. The wording of the passage immediately following that quoted at the beginning of the previous paragraph suggests that he is here using benevolence as a general name to cover a number of particular affections of similar tendency rather than distinguishing it from them as a special principle superior to the affections. "And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is momentary love; if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another; this is itself benevolence or the love of another."[6] Butler would never have said at the end of a list of "private affections," "these are *themselves* self-love, or the love of oneself." He would have said, "these are approved by self-love," or, "these are affections that minister to the end desired by self-love, namely, the agent's own happiness." The fact that he can say of certain "public affections" that they are *themselves* benevolence seems clearly to support the view that benevolence is not a separate, superior, principle in the sense in which we shall see he thinks self-love is. It is surprising that anyone should have thought that Butler considered benevolence a general principle co-ordinate with self-love. A careful reading of the *Sermons* makes it quite plain that for Butler benevolence is only one among the many particular affections,[7] though treated rather more fully than the

[1] II, 31. [2] II, 18. [3] II, 166. [4] II, 173.
[5] C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 71 *et seq.* [6] II, 31–33.
[7] I had come to this conclusion before I found that the same point is made by Dr. Reginald Jackson in his article on "Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism" (*Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, 1943).

others because of his eagerness to impress upon his congregation the necessity for their encouraging it in their own dealings with their fellows.

There is a sense, however, in which benevolence is different from the other particular affections. Benevolent acts are "their own reward." Butler makes this point in the following passage. "One man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to obtain which he thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with such a singularity of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his end, which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain. In case of success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as the man of ambition; they both equally having the end their affections, in the same degree, tended to: but in case of disappointment, the benevolent man has clearly the advantage; since endeavouring to do good considered as a virtuous pursuit, is gratified by its own consciousness, i.e. is in a sense its own reward."[1]

This may be true; in any case, it is clear that what has just been said does not affect the truth of the statement made earlier that benevolence is for Butler merely one among the many particular affections. We shall now consider self-love.

Self-love must be clearly distinguished from the particular affections. There seem to be two senses in which "self-love" is used in the *Sermons*: (*a*) cool self-love, and (*b*) what I might be allowed to call "supposed self-love." Self-love was a term which had tended to be used loosely; Butler makes it quite clear that for him self-love means cool self-love. Those who, like Hobbes, identify particular affections with self-love, are identifying them with something which is not self-love at all—i.e. with supposed self-love. Real self-love (cool self-love) is a rational principle. "The principle we call self-love . . . belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own interest or happiness."[2]

We do not always act from cool self-love but often from one of the particular affections or appetites, and the object of such action is not pleasure for the self but gratification for the particular affection or appetite in question. Butler often[3] speaks of a man "rushing into certain ruin," merely to gratify some passion or appetite, knowing perfectly well that what he is doing is against his own best interests. Is such a man to be spoken of as acting according to the dictates of self-love? Hobbes would reply yes, but, says Butler, he is obviously wrong. Hobbes tries to explain away all particular affections, and represents the whole life as "nothing but one continued exercise of self-love," and so we have "the confusion of calling actions interested

[1] II, 167. And cf. II, 173, and II, 169.
[2] II, 158.
[3] E.g. II, 34 *footnote*; II, 52.

which are done in contradiction to the most manifest known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion."[1]

Hobbes does not seem to be able to distinguish self-love from the particular appetites and affections, which may or may not minister to it; his use of the term "self-love" is what Butler calls "passionate or sensual" self-love (what I have called supposed self-love). It is to be noted that Butler himself retains this second wrong use of self-love in passages in the *Sermons* where he is attacking Hobbism, and he does not always remember to say cool self-love when he means cool self-love. But there is no real difficulty in seeing which he means in any particular passage. Butler similarly distinguishes "real interest" (which he calls simply "interest") and "supposed interest." These remarks are important in view of what will be maintained later in this section about the relation which holds between cool self-love and conscience in the *Sermons*.

One further point of interest here is his statement that benevolence and cool self-love are not to be opposed; what we do for the public good will invariably turn out to be for our own good also.

"I must . . . remind you that though benevolence and self-love are different; though the former tends most directly to public good, and the latter to private: yet they are so perfectly coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made for both."[2]

We need to note an allied point in connection with self-love.

This is the interesting and undoubtedly true remark that Butler makes, to the effect that it would be a good thing for mankind if everybody cultivated self-love more. It is not to be lamented that "men have so great regard to their own good or interest in the present world, for they have not enough."[3] If self-love were a stronger principle in man he would not be so often led by appetites and passions of the moment into acts which are contrary to his real interest (and, on Butler's theory, the interest of the rest of mankind).

We shall now consider Butler's treatment of *conscience* in detail. This is the part of his ethics which has raised most problems for his critics. Butler is not altogether consistent in his treatment of conscience in the *Sermons*, but we shall do our best to discover what he really intended to say.

The word "conscience" seems somehow to carry with it a suggestion of the mysterious. It conjures up before our mind's eye a vision of a strange faculty that is not under our control and that makes

[1] II, 19. [2] II, 33. [3] II, 22.

pronouncements *ex cathedra* which we are bound to obey whether we want to or not. But we shall see that there is nothing mysterious or other-worldly about conscience as Butler treats it in the *Sermons*, although it certainly has an element of authority.

(1) The first important point to note is that Butler speaks of this faculty as conscience *or reflection*; in some places he refers to it as *reflex approbation or disapprobation*. The notion of reflection is uppermost in his idea of conscience. The complaint is sometimes made against Butler that he does not concern himself with the nature of conscience—"whether called moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart."[1] The passage just quoted occurs in the Dissertation on Virtue appended to the *Analogy*, and however doubtful he may seem to be of the nature of conscience in the later work (and he is not really in doubt there, as we shall see in the next section), in the *Sermons* there is no question what he thinks. For the Butler of the *Sermons*, conscience is reason. The dictates of conscience come to us when we apply our powers of reflection to the circumstances in which we find ourselves.

(2) Again, conscience is authoritative. Butler says, in a famous passage, "Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world."[2] The distinction between strength and authority is a very useful and important one. For Butler, conscience or reflection has authority over all other "instincts and principles of action" in man. Unfortunately, although it has this authority it has not sufficient strength to be sure always of getting its dictates obeyed. It is in the position of a Sovereign who, by virtue of being Sovereign, has authority over his people, but who can never be certain that he will have control of the army at any particular time, so that he can never know whether or not he will be able to enforce on his people any order he may make. A man's appetites and passions will often prove stronger than reflection and will lead him into acts which he knows to be wrong. When Butler distinguishes the authority of conscience from its strength he is only saying what had often been said before, though by no one as well as by Ovid, "Video meliora proboque; Deteriora sequor." Butler is making his own statement of the problem of insight into the right *versus* weakness of will. "The good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." Butler expresses this universal experience by saying that conscience has authority, but not the amount of strength that would be commensurate with its authority.

If Butler were asked *why* he considered conscience to have authority over the other parts that make up our nature, in view of the

[1] I, 328. [2] II, 55.

fact that that authority is often ineffectual, he would answer that it is a plain fact of experience. We simply *know* that conscience is authoritative, in spite of the fact that its promptings are often overruled by the appetites and passions. Butler can only appeal to each man's introspection, if he would doubt the authority of conscience. The inference would seem to be that if anyone found himself completely unable to see for himself in his own experience that conscience possesses this natural authority, there would be no way of convincing him that it does.

All this amounts to saying that we *ought* to obey conscience. Butler is not much concerned to discuss the meaning of obligation, but he makes practical use of the idea. He mentions it in this connection. "But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet it may be asked, 'What obligations are we under to attend to and follow it?' I answer: it has been proved that man by his nature is a law to himself. . . . The question then carries its own answer along with it. Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity."[1]

(3) A third point concerning conscience or reflection is that it leads us to seek the good of others. Butler makes this point in the course of a discussion of human nature near the beginning of the Second Sermon,[2] where he shows that to act according to our natures does not mean to follow whatever impulse happens to be uppermost at the moment, but to act according to conscience, which involves among other things "doing good to others," because conscience approves such acts. Conscience leads us to maximize the happiness of others.

(4) Finally, it is to be noted that nowhere in the *Sermons* does Butler speak of conscience as a superior principle to cool self-love. It is the particular appetites and passions (and supposed self-love) that are to be brought before the bar of reflection.

Now let us traverse the ground covered by these four points again, this time considering cool self-love along with conscience. The fact that Butler used the two terms conscience and cool self-love shows clearly enough that he thought they were distinct principles, but from his own treatment of them in the *Sermons* I hope to show that,

[1] II, 60. [2] II, 46.

although they may be distinguished mentally, they are not to be distinguished in their practical effects. For all practical purposes, conscience *is* cool self-love.

(1) Conscience is reflection. So is cool self-love. And they both lead us the same way. When we reflect on a given situation, what our conscience tells us is right is also what cool self-love tells us is to our own interest. "Virtue and interest are not to be opposed, but only to be distinguished from each other."[1] That is to say, virtuous acts are, as a matter of fact, such as always tend to our own interest. But Butler is prepared to go further than this. He maintains elsewhere that it is the happiness-producing character of acts that *makes* them right. That is, the ground or criterion of the rightness of an act is its felicific quality for the agent. Butler does not identify "right" with "productive of happiness"; he does not say that that is what "right" *means*; he would certainly have said that "right" simply means "right" and nothing else. But he does maintain that all right acts are also acts productive of happiness for the agent, and that "productive of happiness" may be regarded as the *ground* of rightness. The test of whether an act is right or not, is whether or not it is productive of happiness for the agent. "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."[2]

(2) Again, conscience and cool self-love are alike in that they are both spoken of as having positions of authority in the human constitution. In the Second Sermon, Butler speaks of a man who, although he clearly sees that a certain act will not be to his real interest, yet is unable to refrain from doing it. This, he says, would properly be called an unnatural act. "Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered merely as a part of his nature? No: for if he had acted the contrary way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his nature, namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it would end in immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural action: whereas to contradict or go against cool self-love for the sake of such gratification, is so in the instance before us. Such an action then being unnatural; and its being so not arising from a man's going against a principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle or desire which happens for the present to be strongest; it necessarily follows, that there must be some other difference or distinction to be made between these two

[1] II, 21. [2] II, 173.

principles, passion and cool self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. And this difference, not being a difference in strength or degree, I call a difference in *nature* and in *kind*."[1]

The difference between cool self-love and the particular appetites and passions is that the former is a superior principle, and as such has authority over the appetites and passions. It ought to be obeyed, though very often it is overruled by the appetites and passions. Butler had said the same thing about conscience.

(3) Butler has shown that cool self-love and benevolence are not opposed; benevolence may go against supposed interest, but never against real interest. Cool self-love recognizes that benevolence is to our own interest. But Butler's conscience, it will be remembered, also recommends benevolence. Thus we have, again, an aspect of conscience and cool self-love in which they coincide.

Here we may offer in illustration a quotation from the Third Sermon: "Let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of our nature [*sc.*, conscience]. And the sum is no more than this: 'Why should we be concerned about any thing out of and beyond ourselves? If we do find within ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not how many different kinds; yet these being embarrassments, and hindering us from going the nearest way to our own good, why should we not endeavour to suppress and get over them?'

"Thus people go on with words which, when applied to human nature, and the condition in which it is placed in this world, have really no meaning. For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition, that our happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct from regard to others; and that it is the privilege of vice to be without restraint or confinement?"[2] In this quotation Butler is quite obviously equating conscience with cool self-love on the ground that both lead us to do good to others.

Only supposed self-love could lead a man to think that his real interest lay outside regard to others. Cool self-love will convince him otherwise.

(4) The fourth point concerning conscience which was made above is obviously of importance here. That Butler should nowhere in the *Sermons* have spoken of conscience as a principle *superior to* cool self-love cannot be said to be an objection to the suggestion that I have offered, *viz.* that conscience and cool self-love are, for all practical purposes, the same thing.

I have now completed my attempt to show the practical identity of conscience and self-love as Butler treats them in the *Sermons*. It may be felt that I have laboured overlong in trying to prove a point

[1] II, 53. [2] II, 61.

that might have been made by a single quotation, but I felt it would be valuable to try to show in some detail how conscience and self-love are tied up together. The quotation which might have been enough to make the point may now be of use in driving it home:

"Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man: because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own *supposed interest* [my emphasis], at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness."[1]

The dictates of cool self-love and the dictates of conscience are always the same. What reflection shows us is right, is also what will be to our own interest; what reflection shows us is to our own interest, will be that which is right. In short, conscience and cool self-love are but different sides of the same faculty—reflection.

Butler very clearly sees the strength of the psychological hedonist position. Hobbes's statement of it was confused, and Butler laid bare Hobbes's confusions in a masterly way. But, in point of fact, his own position is not so very different from Hobbes's. Hobbes had had a false view about the nature of self-love; Butler has corrected this, but in effect he has left self-love as the first principle of action. Butler's position is a sort of enlightened egoism. Hobbes's position can be interpreted very similarly. Generally speaking, of course, Hobbes is a psychological egoistic hedonist of the most complete kind, but he does have a place in his theory for reason. Hobbes thinks that men are by nature self-regarding, and that their natural condition is one of "war of all against all"; but he allows that they have the faculty of reason, and reason makes it clear to them that wholly individualistic activity tends to defeat its own end. Of course, on his view, reason alone is not enough to persuade men, once they have left the condition in which their life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," to keep their contract—a central power, capable of inspiring fear and inflicting punishment on any who try to break the social contract, is also needed. None the less, he does have some place in

[1] II, 64.

his theory for reason, by which he means a sort of enlightened self-love. Is not this very like Butler's theory?

Butler's refutation of Hobbes in the earlier part of the *Sermons* has not prevented Hobbism from reappearing in a more respectable form as Butler develops his own doctrine. Butler has refined Hobbes's crude egoism, but he has not made it any the less egoism. Butler is a rational egoist, while Hobbes had tended to be (though, as has just been pointed out, he was not altogether) an irrational egoist.

However, in spite of the likeness between Butler's and Hobbes's theories, it would not be accurate to call Butler a Psychological Hedonist. Indeed, as far as ethics is concerned, his memory is probably more honoured for his refutation of psychological hedonism than for anything else. If the ethical theory of the *Sermons* must be given a label, it had better be called Ethical Egoistic Eudaemonism.

Butler is not, strictly speaking, a hedonist; he does not regard pleasure as the ultimate good; that position he gives to happiness, and by happiness he means much more than pleasure; he means what Aristotle meant by εὐδαιμονία—a general well-being of soul.

Butler is an Egoistic Eudaemonist in that he believes that we ought to seek *our own* happiness. "Though there were an equality of affection to both, yet regards to ourselves would be more prevalent than attention to the concerns of others. And from moral considerations it ought to be so."[1] There are in the *Sermons* what appear to be Utilitarian passages, but these are easily subsumable under the enlightened egoism which Butler has developed—we best gain our own true interests by helping forward the interests of others.

Butler is an Ethical Eudaemonist rather than a Psychological Eudaemonist; although there is a sense in which he is both. In so far as we act according to our true nature we do, in fact, always seek our own happiness; so to that extent we are Psychological Eudaemonists. However, we do not always act according to our true nature. So it is safer to say that Butler is an Ethical Eudaemonist: although there may be times when we act "unnaturally," in that we do not seek our own happiness, we always *ought* to seek it.

This completes our exposition of the ethics of the *Sermons*.

There are one or two passages in the *Sermons* which seem contrary to the interpretation of that work here offered. The apparent difficulties in these passages are, however, quickly resolved when it is realized that they are merely foreshadowings of the theory Butler was later to develop in the *Analogy*. They will be best considered in the fourth section of this article, after we have examined the ethics of the *Analogy*, which is the task to which we shall next turn. But before concluding this section I should like to emphasize again the main points in the ethical theory of the *Sermons*.

[1] II, 184.

Man's first or basic duty is to seek his own happiness, but because he is a social animal he cannot gain his own happiness unless he is willing to further the happiness of others. If he does what will conduce to his own happiness he will also be doing what is right. The ground or criterion of rightness is "conduciveness to the agent's interest." The faculty of reflection discovers for us our duty/interest in any circumstance by a process of hard reasoning. This last point is the one I would emphasize most strongly. In the *Sermons*, conscience is essentially reason.

The ethics of the *Analogy* will be dealt with in Part II.

[*to be concluded*]

LOGICAL NECESSITY

STUART HAMPSHIRE, M.A.

I

It may sometimes be useful in philosophy to state a method of argument in very simple and even over-simplified terms; it may at a certain stage be useful to ignore for the moment the details and difficulties of particular philosophical arguments, and to try to state simply what is commonly assumed in a variety of different and even opposing arguments.

That is my purpose in this article. There are many complexities in the notion of logical necessity, and it might be difficult to find two philosophers who would agree altogether and in detail about its proper use. But I believe that at a certain level of superficiality and imprecision some measure of agreement about the use of the notion in philosophy is possible. Many contemporary philosophers seem to be using the notion in the same general way; it is this common use which I wish to describe. It is necessary to disentangle the outline of a general use of the notion of logical necessity from current controversies about what is "purely arbitrary" or "merely conventional"; so many students of philosophy have been left with the impression that philosophy is now being presented as a trivial and unnecessary verbal game.

II

LOGICAL NECESSITY

To say that two propositions p and q are necessarily connected logically is equivalent to saying that "p and not q" is an impossible expression; it is impossible, not because we find by experience that p and not q are never in fact both true (which is causal necessity), but because "p and not q" is an expression which has no use in our language as representing a possible state of the world; in other words, "p and not q" is impossible because it is meaningless.

Most philosophers and non-philosophers now recognize and accept some such general description of what is meant by logical necessity and logical impossibility. But for centuries there was confusion, not confined to professional philosophers, about the distinction between logical and causal necessity; this confusion had important practical effects by retarding the development of natural science. That there is a distinction is now generally recognized, and anyone who is in doubt need only refer to any modern text-book of logic. It may still

be difficult to decide in particular cases whether particular propositions are intended to state logical or causal necessities; whenever the confusion occurs in the statement of theories in any of the experimental sciences, it delays progress until it is exposed. For this reason constant reiteration and illustration of the distinction is one of the most important practical functions of the teaching of logic.

But no thorough and precise statement of what is involved in asserting a logically necessary connection between two propositions will be generally accepted by philosophers; suggestions have been made and controverted, and there is no final agreement.

I shall first state in very general terms what I believe to be the method or methods by which statements of logically necessary connections are established and used; and then I will show by examples how they are used in the solution of some typical problems of philosophy.

Statements of the form p entails q (or "p and not q" is logically impossible) can be divided into two kinds; those which can be formally proved to be true solely by reference to explicit definitions of the terms contained in p and q; and those which cannot be formally proved to be true by reference to explicit definitions of the terms involved. As examples of the first kind or class any proposition of mathematics can be used, the truth of any proposition in mathematics being formally demonstrable by reference to axioms, the denial of any true proposition being *demonstrably* self-contradictory. As examples of the second class the contradictory of any necessary proposition showing the use of any expression in ordinary language can be used; the contradictory of such propositions cannot be formally demonstrated to be self-contradictory by reference to any set of explicit definitions or axioms. I will try to show how these two kinds of statements of logical necessity are differently used in the two different kinds of language.

Formal logic and pure mathematics are designed as an inclusive system containing only demonstrable statements of logically necessary connections between propositions. The system is founded on a set of definitions and axioms, which together constitute the rules for the construction of the system; this is at least the intention and logical ideal or pattern of mathematics; in fact the system is never perfect, new chains of propositions being constantly added to the system before their logically necessary connection with the rest of the system can be demonstrated; the attempt to prove them may lead to an adaptation of the basic definitions and axioms. But the principle remains that the new propositions are not accepted as true statements of logically necessary connections, until they have been demonstrated to follow logically from the axioms and definitions which together define the system of which they are part.

This deliberately constructed system (or systems) of statements of logically necessary connections between propositions, which constitutes mathematics, provides the language in which physical scientists can state the uniform relationships between measurable quantities which they discover by their experiments. When a system of propositions of mathematics is used in this way as a language in which observed uniformities in nature can be stated, it is described as "an interpreted system"; the axioms and definitions by reference to which the set of propositions were constructed by mathematicians then become the rules of logic or the syntax of the interpreted system. To the pure mathematician the meaning of any symbol or expression in a proposition of the system is completely stated in the rules of syntax, which determine its possible combinations with other symbols and expressions in the system. But if one asks the physical scientist about the meaning of the same symbols or expressions, when he is using them as part of an interpreted language for his own purposes, there are two answers he may make: he may, following the mathematician, refer to the axioms or definitions which prescribe the logically possible combinations in which the symbols may occur; but he may also indicate the kind of situation in his laboratory in which, according to the interpretation of the system, it would be appropriate to use the symbols in question.

The usefulness of demonstrable statements of logically necessary connections as they occur in mathematics is not disputed. Any particular part of mathematics is more or less useful—leaving out of account its intrinsic excellence as logic—according as it provides a language whose form and complexity is more or less well adapted to express simply and precisely the measurable relationship which have been discovered by experiment. There is a constant interaction between the development of physical science and that of mathematics; the physical scientist at intervals is presented with experimental results which cannot be expressed adequately, that is, with sufficient precision and simplicity, in the symbolism so far suggested by mathematicians; the logical form of the mathematical language temporarily in use becomes inappropriate to the newly discovered set of experimental results, the inappropriateness being revealed in a constantly increasing clumsiness or imprecision in the statement of general laws. Demands are therefore made which stimulate mathematicians to elaborate their axioms and definitions in order to provide a more convenient language. Conversely, mathematicians periodically open up new branches of mathematics by noticing hitherto neglected logical connections between the propositions or symbols of existing mathematics; the logical form of the new language thus created often suggests to physical scientists a possible interpretation of the new language, and they set out in search of the

experimental results which would justify this interpretation; in this case the shape of the instrument has suggested the possibility of its use.

The mathematician's function[1] is to find the smallest number of basic axioms which provide the greatest number of useful statements of logically necessary connections between propositions; a statement of a logically necessary connection is useful in so far as it can be appropriately (in the sense mentioned) interpreted. More briefly expressed, the mathematician's work is to suggest the smallest number of axioms and definitions which together constitute the necessary and sufficient rules of syntax for a language in which all experimental results can be simply expressed. The scientist's ideal would have been achieved if every general proposition stated in this mathematical language, and experimentally confirmed, could be shown to be a logically necessary consequence of the axioms and definitions of the language; in that ideal case we could say that the form of the language corresponded to the form of facts. [It is important to remember that this is an ideal, not fact. Philosophers sometimes speak as if the form of some actual language corresponds, or even must correspond, to the form of the facts. The truth is that it must correspond *to some* degree, but it never in fact corresponds perfectly.]

The mathematician is free to construct his system of statements of logically necessary connections as he thinks best with these ends in view; that is, he is free to vary his axioms and definitions in such a way as to generate a language of the required form and complexity. But he is not entirely free; he cannot vary all his axioms and definitions simultaneously; for without some constant rules of syntax he cannot make a statement of any kind; without some rules of syntax, all statement or inference would become a meaningless succession of physical marks or sounds. This is no more than a tautology, since the meaning of the symbols in the systems has been defined in terms of the rules which prescribe their use. Mathematicians and logicians in fact proceed by treating the fundamental axioms of logic and mathematics as relatively fixed and inviolable, while reminding themselves that this inviolability is a matter of degree. They say in effect that they could discard this or that fundamental axiom, if they chose, because of course anything *can* be done, provided that the other changes in the system are made which would be necessary to avoid self-contradiction; but no logician or mathematician would ever hope to persuade us to abandon an axiom which governs the use of the language in which much of our knowledge of the world is expressed.

[1] It may not be, probably is not, the mathematician's motive. I suppose that a pure mathematician is ordinarily interested in logical relations for their own sake.

It is important to insist on this principle of the *relative* inviolability of the fundamental axioms of logic because its neglect has led to some of the confusions and controversies about logical necessity to which I have referred. One side says: "All statements of logically necessary connections between propositions are derived from axioms and definitions which are arbitrary and can be varied at will." The other side says: "Certainly many of our statements of logically necessary connections are derived from definitions which are arbitrarily chosen for their convenience; and these we may choose to discard when we find them inconvenient in our construction of new languages. But there are some fundamental axioms of logic, the rules of inference which we use in all deductive systems, for instance, or the rules which govern the use of any symbolism representing the general properties of a series, which we *cannot* alter; they represent rules which we *must* use in the construction of any interpretable language. We should therefore recognize two kinds of statements of logically necessary connections between propositions—the arbitrary and alterable which we call "analytic," and the fixed and immutable which we call "synthetic." Given that statements of logically necessary connections are conventionally labelled "*a priori* propositions" (a label which I have avoided because of its misleading associations), these arguments lead to the question: "Are there any synthetic *a priori* propositions and, if so, which are they, and by what process do we come to know them?"

The confusion and controversy begin to disappear when it is shown that both sides are in a sense right and both sides in another sense wrong. It is right to feel uneasiness at the suggestion that there is a definite number of axioms or rules of use which we must accept as the immutable foundation of logic and mathematics; it is equally right to feel uneasiness at the suggestion that we can discard the Law of the Excluded Middle as easily as we can discard a particular formula defining "energy" in mechanics. In fact we recognize, without formulating, a rough scale of statements of necessary connections; at one end of this scale stand the logical rules which govern all our inferences, and at the other end the equations or formulae which have been found useful in constructing a new hypothesis in physical science. Confusion arises when we say "all statements of necessary connections are arbitrary," because this suggests that they are all *equally* arbitrary, which we know by our logical habits to be untrue; confusion also arises when we say "there are two kinds of statements of necessary connections, one of an immutable connection, the other of an arbitrary connection"; for we know from history that the greatest developments in logic and mathematics have had their origin in a modification of one or other of the so-called basic axioms or definitions. Confusion is complete when we try to divide state-

ments of logically necessary connections into two classes, and to ask ourselves whether particular statements fall into one class or the other; we find that we have no means of answering this question, except by comparing the statement under consideration with other similar statements which we regard as either more or less immutable. We have no difficulty in exhibiting and contrasting extreme cases of the relatively immutable and the purely arbitrary; but in respect of the great majority of the statements of logically necessary connections which we use in expressing the rules of our ordinary language, or the rules governing the symbolism of mathematics or science, we cannot make a clear division into two categories or classes. It is wise in this situation not to speak of two kinds or classes of statements of necessary connection, because to speak in this way invites the question in respect of any particular statement, "To which class does this statement belong?" And this question presents a pseudo-problem in logic, a pseudo-problem in the sense that it is a question to which, in many, and probably most cases, it is in principle impossible to provide an answer. And it is one of the functions of the philosopher to recommend uses of language which do not invite questions which cannot (logically) be answered.

I have said that statements of logically necessary connections between propositions may be demonstrable or not demonstrable, and I have made some generalizations about the use of the first category in logic, mathematics and science, and about the method by which their truth is established. But the philosopher's clarification is not achieved by the use of the symbolism and methods of mathematicians; philosophers use the words of our ordinary, or ordinary-sophisticated, languages, with the aid of the small technical vocabulary of logic.

What I have said about the use of statements of logically necessary connections in mathematics and formal logic, and derivatively in scientific theory, cannot therefore directly illustrate the use of such statements in philosophical argument except by comparison and contrast; but the contrast is very useful, because the differences between statements of necessary connections, which are demonstrable within a deductive system, and such statements in our ordinary languages, are usually neglected, or at least under-estimated, in modern logic. Modern philosophy has been dominated by the example of Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy was dominated by the example of Newton's *Principia*; it is natural that logicians should begin by acting on the assumption that a method so efficient and so clear must be capable of unlimited application. But the "language" of mathematics is totally different in structure from ordinary languages, because it is different in use and purpose.

I have already referred to the clearest illustration of the difference between a formal language, such as the language of mathematics, and an ordinary language—namely, that in a formal language the meaning of the symbols which it contains can be *completely* stated in terms of the axioms and definitions which are the rules of syntax of the system. Inquiries about the meaning of the words and expressions of an ordinary language cannot be completely answered by reference to any explicit definitions or rules of syntax governing their use; we can only satisfy ourselves about the meaning of any expression in an ordinary language by observing and comparing the situations in which this expression is used. It is true that if we are in doubt about the meaning of any expression p, we may be told that p means the same as q, and that whenever p occurs we may substitute q and vice versa, which would be an explicit definition. But if we then inquired into the meaning of q and continued at every stage to call for further definitions, we should reach a point at which we should be told that no further definitions could be given, and that we must study the situations in which the expression was used; we should not, then, as in mathematics, be referred in the last resort to any explicitly formulated basic axioms and definitions, which indirectly govern the use of all the expressions in the system.

We discover the rules governing our use of words in thinking and communicating by reflecting on our actual use; we then try to formulate explicitly the rules which we have in fact been observing. The explicit formulations of these rules of use cannot be proved to be true by reference to any basic axioms or definitions. Those statements or denials of logically necessary connections between propositions, which constitute the arguments and conclusions of philosophers, are formulations of the implicit rules governing our use of words, or of the absence of such rules. They are statements of logical necessity, or its absence, because they are statements of rules or the absence of rules; the words "necessity" and "rule" have the same sense in this context.

We can describe these rules, expressed as statements of logically necessary connections between propositions, as the rules of logical grammar governing our use of language in thinking and communicating; the analogy suggested by the expression "logical grammar" may be useful, because it underlines the fact that, just as we may speak the English language before or without being able to formulate its rules of grammar, so we may think and communicate in *any* language before or without being able to formulate the rules of logical grammar. "Rules of logical grammar" means "rules of syntax applicable in any language"; this is the sense of the word "logical" in this and similar contexts. The analogy also suggests, what is true, that the result of not observing the rules of logical grammar

in actual thinking and communicating is thinking and communicating nonsense, exactly as the result of not observing grammatical rules is the production of nonsense. Belief in nonsense is almost as common a form of error, and certainly as harmful in its practical effects, as believing what is not true; and it is often the most difficult kind of error to detect and eradicate. We can say, if we wish, that we can expose grammatical nonsense by reference to the rules of grammar of the language in question; we can equally say, that we expose logical nonsense or contradiction by reference to those statements of logically necessary connections which express the rules of logic. But in both cases we can also say that the nonsense shows the rule, rather than that the rule shows the nonsense; probably this second statement in most cases better represents the facts, at least in respect of logical rules. We begin to look for logical rules when we notice that we, or somebody else, has become involved in thinking or communicating nonsense; we assume that if we are confronted with nonsense or self-contradiction, there must be a true statement (or denial) of a logically necessary connection between propositions, which *shows* that it is nonsense. Most people only become self-conscious and reflective in their use of language when they notice that something has gone wrong in the use of it, just as most people are only interested in the mechanism of their bodies when they feel ill. But by the study of philosophy one might have been made acutely aware of the logical mechanism of language; one is then able to recognize at an early stage the symptoms of approaching nonsense in others, and to point out the abuses of language which are the cause of the disorder and the rules whose application will prevent it. Unfortunately an inculcated self-consciousness about the logical structure of language often produces that type so well known to the teacher of philosophy, the philosophical hypochondriac; he is the philosopher who affects to see possibilities of contradiction in the most rule-abiding usages, and invents elaborate metaphysical cures for paradoxes which are often the imaginary products of his own neuroses.[1]

I have said that we assume that when we are confronted with a sentence which is nonsense or expresses no proposition, although it is linguistically and grammatically correct, there must be a statement (or denial) of a logically necessary connection which *shows* that it is nonsense. According to my argument, this so-called assumption is no more than a tautology; for when we say that an expression, though linguistically and grammatically correct, is nonsense, we mean that it contravenes some implicit rule of use of the terms involved, and a statement of a logically necessary connection between propositions in this context *is* a statement of an implicit rule of use. I want to

[1] Heidegger and the Existentialists are typical examples.

emphasize the use of the word "show"; by "show" I do not mean "prove." It would be useless to speak of "proving" that a particular sentence (in ordinary, not formal language) was meaningless by reference to a rule of the form "*p* and not *q* is logically impossible"; for if one is asked to show that the statement "*p* and not *q* is logically impossible" is true, one can only exhibit the meaningless expressions which result from thinking and speaking as if it were not true; this is a circular argument, and cannot be described as "proof."

There remains the most difficult of the problems which arise in showing the use of statements of logically necessary connections. A metaphysical reader might agree that statements of logical necessity and logical impossibility are statements of rule; he might agree that this equivalence is tautological, since "necessary," "possible," and "impossible" are in logic only different ways of saying "prescribed by rule," "not contrary to rule," and "contrary to rule." Having made this concession, he might go on to complain that the recognition of this equivalence takes the inquiring mind no further in its effort to understand how or why we believe, or know, certain statements of necessary connection (or their denial) to be true. If he did so complain, he would be entirely right in the substance of what he was saying, and wrong only in nursing a sense of grievance. He would be right, in that in no sense is the notion of rule more "fundamental" or "logically prior" to the notions of necessity or impossibility; in this sense of "explain" the equivalence explains nothing, and "takes one no further." It simply shows a rule about, or states a logically necessary connection between, our use of "logically necessary," "logically impossible" and "logical rule." But I have argued that nothing more helpful *could* be provided; I have tried to show that philosophical explanation could not "take one any further," because "any further" would be nonsense; the complaint of the imaginary metaphysical reader would therefore be unreasonable. But the fact that he does nevertheless complain would show that I had failed to indicate the logical rule, or to state the necessary connection, which would show that no explanation of the kind he is seeking is possible. A logical analysis is shown to be defective if its conclusions (statements or denials of logical connections) allow the asking of questions which are in principle unanswerable. "In principle" here means that any answer must (logically) be meaningless; the conclusions must *show* that any such question is meaningless and cannot be asked.

The imaginary metaphysical reader is not satisfied that we recognize the truth and statements or denials of logically necessary connections simply by reflecting on the rules which in fact govern our standard use of words. He wants to ask "Why are these particular rules necessary?" "Could we, if we chose, use entirely different logical rules?" The answer to the first question is that the statement or

denial of a logically necessary connection can itself be called necessary only as being necessarily connected with another statement or denial of a necessary connection which we are assuming to be true; considered in isolation from other similar statements, it cannot be described as either necessary or impossible, but only as true or false. For illustration, consider the following statement of a logically necessary connection: "the same body cannot occupy two different positions in space at the same time." This is a true statement of a logically necessary connection, if it correctly expresses[1] a rule governing our ordinary use of the expression "the same body" (in any language). But it is meaningless to ask "Is this rule, or statement of necessity, itself necessary?" unless what is meant is "Is this rule, or statement of necessity, necessarily connected with some other rule or statement of necessity?" The answer to the metaphysical inquirer's second question, "Could we change the rules?" is "If you mean by "could we change the rules?" "is it logically possible to change the rules?" the answer is "yes," provided that we change them in such a way that they do not contradict each other. If you do not mean by "could" "is it logically possible?" I do not know what you do mean; or rather I know that you mean nothing and are asking a meaningless question. A statement of a logical necessity is itself necessary only in relation to other statements of logical necessity. If we consider my particular example of a rule governing our use of the word "body," it is clear that we might decide to abandon it if, for instance, it were found inconvenient in the interpretation (in ordinary language) of some new theory of microscopic physics; physicists have already shown themselves prepared to suggest no less radical changes in our logical habits. But we should resist until we were satisfied that the experimental results could not be simply and precisely stated without some such radical derangement of the logical structure of language. The principle of relative inviolability is applied to the logical rules governing our use of ordinary language as well as to the rules governing the case of mathematical symbols. There are some rules of use which we would never consider abandoning, because they are too deeply embedded in the whole structure of our languages, and any change in them would involve a complete derangement of all our logical habits. There are others at the opposite end of the scale which we recognize as convenient in the face of the hitherto known facts of experience, but which we would be prepared to abandon if they proved inconvenient in the simple and precise representation of a new set of facts.

The metaphysician might at this point make his last attack: "Will you admit that the ordinary logical rules which govern our use of

[1] It is bad (logical) grammar to speak of a rule as being true or false. What is true or false is the statement that it is a rule.

language are imposed on us by the facts which we experience, and that they are, in this sense of the word, necessary? And, secondly, will you admit that there are a few fundamental logical principles which *must* govern the use of any language, and that therefore the statements of these logical principles are true of *all possible worlds*?" My answer to the first question is that facts impose nothing, the phrase is meaningless. If the metaphysician reflects, he will admit that he has been betrayed into a familiar logical confusion about the use of the word "necessary." The same confusion is shown by the occurrence of the word "must" in the second question; namely the confusion between compulsion and logical necessity. Lastly, the statement that statements of logical principles are true "of all possible worlds" is a badly expressed tautology; it is a tautology because "all possible worlds" simply means "worlds which can be described or conceived in language," and logical principles determine what can be described or conceived in language; we cannot think except in language, and to use language meaningfully is to observe certain logical rules. The logical rules say what worlds are possible, therefore to say that the statement of them is true of all possible worlds adds nothing. But it is a misleading statement because it suggests that statements of logical rules are statements about the world, which by definition they are not.

That we should observe *some* rules in our thoughts and communications about the world is a statement of logical necessity; there can be no symbols without rules governing the use of the sounds, marks or images which are the signs. "Used according to rule" is part of what we mean by "symbol." But that we should use the set of rules, considering them all together, which we do use, cannot itself be a logical necessity; in this sense therefore the fact that we do use a particular set of rules is a fact about the world.

III

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

I have tried to show in general how statements of logically necessary connections between propositions are used, and why they are useful. I have myself necessarily been using in this explanation the method which I am explaining, that is, I have been exhibiting some of the logical rules governing the use of such words and expressions, as "logically necessary" "proposition," "language," "demonstrate," "meaningless," and others. The sentences which have expressed my argument have expressed propositions of the form "*p* and not *q* is logically impossible." These propositions will have served their purpose as a philosophical argument if the reader is (*a*) satisfied

that I have correctly shown how these expressions are used, and therefore what they mean, and is (*b*) persuaded by this analysis of their meaning that certain philosophical pseudo-questions (the asking of which is certainly not confined to professional philosophers) cannot (logically) be asked, or are meaningless. My argument ought therefore to have been at the same time an explanation and an illustration of logical analysis.

But philosophers are not always engaged in expounding their own method, although such explanations are as necessary to the efficiency of philosophy as is mathematical logic to the efficiency of mathematics. If they are genuine philosophers, they solve problems whose solution is essential to the development of knowledge of the world; their solutions are subject to the test—how far do the solutions of these problems contribute to the advancement of knowledge? If philosophy were not in this sense useful it would be an intellectual game, like chess; and at periods in its history it has in fact become an intellectual game (but usually much inferior intellectually to chess), because philosophers have not applied this criterion of usefulness in selecting and solving logical problems, but have revelled in verbal entanglements for their own sake.

The attention of philosophers has been concentrated on the statement of those logical rules or necessary connections the neglect or misinterpretation of which has *in fact* obstructed the advancement of knowledge of the world. Logical problems are not invented by logicians; they *show themselves* in the occurrence of paradoxes and contradictions, and in the asking of questions which we find that we cannot (logically) answer within our language, but which we cannot immediately show (by the statement of a logical rule) to be meaningless questions. The paradoxes, contradictions and meaningless questions (if they are genuine) suggest themselves or occur in the use of language for its proper purpose of representing the facts of our experience. We *seem* to be unable (logically) to say what, in face of the facts, we want to say, because what we want to say seems to entail (i.e. to be logically necessarily connected with) a contradiction, or to entail the possibility of asking a question which we cannot (logically) answer; such a situation shows that something is wrong in our interpretation of our own use, or, in other words, that a logical problem exists. The philosopher's work in solving the problem is first to reflect on the actual use of the expressions in question, and then to suggest rules for their proper use in statements of logical connection and independence; these statements must clearly show the impossibility of contradiction in the proper use of the words in question, and the meaninglessness of the unanswerable questions. "A rule of proper use" is defined as "the rule which most closely reflects our habitual use and is free from the possibility of contradic-

tion."[1] The statement by a philosopher of the proper use of an expression may sometimes surprise the unreflective layman, who has never stopped to consider the possibilities of contradiction which his logical habits involve; it may show that he has sometimes been capable of thinking and talking nonsense; but if it is a true statement of proper use, it will never (as the definition of "proper" shows) prevent him from saying what he wants to say about the world.

It would be useful to give examples of the use of logical analysis so defined applied to the older and better known problems of philosophy. I will mention only one example—the problem of free-will. The logical problem arises because we want to be able (logically) to make two different kinds of statement, which appear to be contradictory; what we first believe without consideration to be the logical rules governing the expressions involved appear to forbid us to say what we believe to be sometimes true or probably true. We want to say that all events, including our decisions to act, are in principle predictable in the light of knowledge of natural laws; but we also sometimes want to say "I could have acted otherwise." At first sight, or if the use of the words "natural law" and "could" in this context are misunderstood, these two statements about the world, each of which we consider could (logically) be true, seem incompatible. Logical analysis shows, by exhibiting the rules of use of "natural law" and "can" in such contexts, that the two statements can (logically) both be true. In addition to the intrinsic extra-logical interest of this particular problem, with its religious and ethical associations, the paradox has been useful in exposing a common confusion in interpretation of the meaning of (i.e. proper rules of use of) "natural law."

The conclusions of logical analysis are generally statements of distinction (that is, denials of necessary connections) between propositions which by habit have been confused. Some confusions are so gross that they are quickly forgotten, others are so subtle that they impose on the world, including the scientific world, for generations until they are exposed by philosophers of exceptional logical insight like Hume or Russell. Some are created by philosophers themselves as a by-product of their own work. Others—and these are the most important—arise unavoidably from the introduction of new methods of representation in natural science and mathematics; the new methods outrage logical conservatism founded on logical habit, and their convenience and consistency must be explained before the results of new experiment can be understood. If logical prejudice is allowed to prevail, as has sometimes happened in the history of

[1] A contradiction arises when rules conflict; rules conflict when one rule suggests that you may say *p*, another that you cannot say *p*. A third rule is then required to delimit the application of the other two.

science, and the new language is dismissed as "impossible," the possibilities of further experiment may be obscured for decades. The work of logical analysis is never finished, because the discovery of new and more precise methods of representation of new facts is never finished; also because new superstitions founded on new logical abuses, or on old abuses in new dress, are constantly appearing.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND THE FUNCTION OF REASON

Professor BERNARD PHILLIPS

> The mob of sophists, however, raise against reason the usual cry of absurdities and contradictions, and though unable to penetrate to its innermost designs, they none the less inveigh against its prescriptions. Yet it is to the beneficent influences exercised by reason that they owe the possibility of their own self-assertiveness. . . .
>
> Kant.

Metaphysics as a human enterprise is for ever called upon to vindicate its claim to be entitled "knowledge." Sometimes the challenge is issued in the name of irritated common sense. Sometimes metaphysics is relegated into insignificance by a supercilious estheticism. Sometimes metaphysics is excommunicated for daring to trespass on the holy domain of religion. Here its death sentence is pronounced by an all-embracing scepticism, and there by the confident faith in the universal adequacy and exclusive validity of the methods of science. The attacks on metaphysics throughout the ages have been so numerous and so severe that one would expect the victim to have expired long ago. Yet the inextinguishable will-to-live exhibited by metaphysics has been as remarkable a phenomenon as the perennial tenacity of her would-be executioners. And although the bells have been tolled many times for metaphysics, she is still able to announce with Mark Twain that the rumours of her demise have been slightly exaggerated. In the long run, history seems to reveal a singular indocility with respect to the arguments of the enemies of metaphysics, and as Gilson has pointed out, one of the lessons to be derived from the study of the history of philosophy is that metaphysics always buries its undertakers.

The persistence of the metaphysical urge in the face of countless demonstrations of the futility of metaphysics has always been something of an embarrassing puzzle to those who regard these demonstrations as cogent. How is this widespread imperviousness to rational argument to be explained? Is it the result merely of intellectual perversity or obtuseness? Is it that the human mind has a constitutional bent toward this illegitimate activity which is too ingrained to be extirpated by logic? Does the "metaphysical craving"—as Schopenhauer terms it—result from some prehistoric disarrangement in the ancestral genes, or from some kind of intellectual original sin which the depraved nature of man cannot now overcome by its own efforts? To the evolutionary point of view which holds the human

mind to be solely an instrument of adaptation and sees in mental functions only evolved modes of response to the environment, the very existence of metaphysics is a profound enigma.

That man should exhibit such doggedness in connection with a pursuit utterly unrelated to the struggle for existence is a puzzling circumstance, and it has been interpreted by some as shedding a significant light on his nature and destiny. The perennial quest for metaphysical knowledge implies, it has been said, that the human mind has deep-rooted interests which go beyond the "empirical employment of the understanding," and provides grounds for the expectation that these interests may in some measure at least be satisfied. The need to interpret the universe and to comprehend its meaning is as authentic as the desire to describe the facts and to predict and control the course of events, and accounts for the resistance put up by the intellect when it is offered as its sole assignment the spelling out of the appearances. It is this metaphysical need which generates a kind of restless dissatisfaction with ordinary knowledge and which is given voice in the poet's question:

> To gather facts from far and near,
> Upon the mind to hold them clear,
> And, knowing more may yet appear,
> Unto one's latest breath to fear,
> The premature result to draw—
> Is this the object, end, and law,
> And purpose of our being here?

As the deviation of a heavenly body from its calculated orbit implies the existence of another body whose gravitational pull has been overlooked, so, the argument runs, the metaphysical orientation of the human mind implies a corresponding reality by which it is attracted and which it needs to know for the full measure of its intellectual well-being. And, to change the metaphor, if the mind, by its very nature, can no more subsist on an intellectual bill of fare from which metaphysics has been eliminated than the body can thrive on a diet deficient in certain food elements, then it is comprehensible and to be expected that there should exist a metaphysical hunger comparable to the craving for certain kinds of food which have not been present in the diet. It is along some such lines as these that the metaphysical yearning is explained by those philosophies which take seriously the fact of man's metaphysical inquietude, and which attempt in various ways to give expression and direction to the mind's reaching out after another kind of knowledge.

The evaluation of metaphysical knowledge in any philosophical system is bound up with the ways of knowing which it recognizes as valid, and particularly diagnostic of its general outlook is the conception which a philosophy holds of the function of reason. The

problem of the role played by reason in the cognitive enterprise has haunted Western philosophy from the beginning, and twenty-five hundred years of reflection have not wholly cleared up the mystery. The entire history of philosophy could be rewritten from the point of view of the way in which various philosophers have handled the problem of the function of reason, and of the manner in which the other features of their systems have been determined by the prior stand taken with reference to this question. Such stands form a continuous spectrum varying from the one extreme of regarding reason as defining the essence of man, as operating in virtual independence of sense-experience, and as disclosing a realm of ultimate reality not open to the other faculties, to the other extreme of viewing reason as the tool of desire, as contributing no content to knowledge, and as confined in its activity to a tautologous transformation of symbols referring to sense-data. To see the history of philosophy as a perennial battleground between two opposing evaluations of reason is an instructive over-simplification.

Empiricisms in the history of philosophy have all minimized the role of reason in knowledge, and have maintained that in the last analysis it is sensation which supplies all concepts with content. In other terms, they have asserted the sensory character of intuition, and have denied to reason any power of "vision." The function of reason, according to the empiricist philosophies, is limited to rearranging the data delivered by the senses. Reason can make no material contribution to knowledge, nor is it in a position to state any truths on its own; reason left to itself can only tautologize. As there is no rational intuition, reason is powerless to issue any sort of synthetic *a priori* judgments, and all true propositions must, therefore, be confirmable *a posteriori*. In consequence, there is only one kind of objective knowledge, namely the knowledge of the factual inter-connections of things in space and time. Except for questions concerning the inter-relations of ideas, to wit, questions of mathematics and logic, all meaningful inquiries must be *quaestiones facti*; and except for logico-mathematical propositions which are empty of factual content, all meaningful propositions are descriptive in nature. It follows that, for the consistent empiricist, metaphysics as such can have no distinct subject-matter, for it has neither its proper organ of cognition—the only legitimate use of the understanding being its empirical employment—nor does metaphysics have any particular objects to investigate, inasmuch as the whole of "reality," i.e. the totality of actual objects and events in space and time, constitutes the legal hunting-grounds of the sciences. It is in the light of such an analysis that Hume, summarizing the sentiments of all consistent empiricist philosophers, declares that any piece of writing which is not either empirical or logico-mathematical and which yet

pretends to be knowledge should be consigned "to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

In present-day philosophy, the strictest custodians of the empiricist tradition are to be found in the school which began its existence under the name of the "Vienna Circle" and has since come to be known as "Logical Positivism" or "Logical Empiricism." Logical Positivism attempts to synthesize the basic teachings of the older empiricisms with the insights derived from recent investigations in mathematical logic and the foundations of science. In the formulations of the Logical Positivists the essential features of empiricist doctrine receive a new precision of statement and augmentation in detail. Discourse is divided into *emotive* and *cognitive*. Emotive discourse serves merely to convey or arouse emotion or to stimulate to action, but asserts nothing about any actual state of affairs. Ethics, esthetics, and metaphysics are all, according to the Logical Positivist, examples of the emotive use of language. Cognitive discourse is of two types: the purely formal statements of mathematics and logic which are merely tautologies and say nothing about the nature of things, and empirical statements which are at least in principle capable of satisfying the empirical criterion of meaning. The propositions of mathematics and logic are *a priori* because they are analytic; all other meaningful propositions are *a posteriori* and synthetic. The business of philosophy comes under the heading of *logical analysis* or *logical syntax*.

The philosophers of the non-empiricist persuasion, on the other hand, have characteristically held out for a type or level of knowledge which is other than the mathematical or the empirical, and have charged that empiricism results both from and in an emasculation of the potencies of the human mind. Knowledge, from their point of view, is of several kinds; there are "degrés du savoir"—in Maritain's phrase—to which correspond degrees of reality. And so these philosophers, in one way or another, have argued for a realm of meaning which is other than the sensory one, and have consistently repudiated the attempt of the empiricists to construe reality in exclusively sensory terms. They have insisted that the whole reality or being of things is not given in sensation, and that there is a "seeing" which is not of the senses but of reason. Endowed with a power of intuition analogous to the power possessed by the senses, reason has its own distinctive contribution to make to the sum of knowledge and is not merely ancillary to the senses. The work of reason is not confined to the grouping and rearranging of particular sense-data; the function of reason is to grasp the necessary in the particular; its concern is with the valid and the universal. Reason can never rest content with a mere description of the facts, but seeks always to penetrate to their essences and to sit in judgment on the

facts. And while it may be indisputable that from the psycho-genetic point of view "all our knowledge begins with sense-experience," it is equally true that human knowledge is more than the recording of sense-data.

To say this is to say that experience may be confronted with two types of questions, namely, with *quaestiones juris* as well as with *quaestiones facti*, and not merely with the latter type alone as empiricists hold. The claim that the question *"Quid juris?"* is relevant to experience is in the last analysis the distinguishing characteristic of the non-empiricist tradition in the history of philosophy, as the defining trait of empiricism is the counter-claim that to reality, as identical with what is factually presented in sense-experience, only descriptive inquiries are germane. The former claim is intelligible only on the assumption that reality comprehends a dimension other than its factual one, so that in addition to empirical inquiries pertaining to the actual order and connection of things there is also place for inquiries of a different nature in which reason is particularly interested. To equate reality with fact is to leave no toehold for criticism and no room for any but descriptive inquiries, and the Logical Positivists are then entirely within their rights in denying cognitive status to metaphysics, ethics, and esthetics. If reality is synonymous with fact, then since the various areas of fact have already been parcelled out among the sciences, it must follow that the philosophical disciplines are without any proper subject-matter and refer to nothing which is objectively real. The only thing left for philosophy is the analysis of the methodology of the sciences, and thus it is that some positivists have simply defined philosophy as the logic of science. The non-empiricists, however, view reality as containing more than fact, and charge the empiricists with reifying an abstraction in recognizing only the one dimension. Reality is bipolar, say the non-empiricists, and as there is a knowledge proper to the one pole in which reason is subservient to the senses—the knowledge of the sciences which is a report on the actual, so also is there a knowledge bound up with the other dimension of reality which is an evaluation of the actual in the light of the ideal. It is in connection with the latter pole that the human mind reveals interests over and above its interest in describing the facts, and it is in relation to this other pole that reason plays a role beyond that assigned to it by empiricism. Corresponding to the two dimensions of reality, the mind has two sets of interests which we may call descriptive interests and reflective interests. A descriptive inquiry raises the question *"Quid facti?"* A reflective inquiry asks *"Quid juris?"* Philosophy is preeminently the field of reflective inquiries, and this is but another way of emphasizing the perennial concern of philosophy with the real as over against the apparent, with values as over against facts, with the

true, the good, and the beautiful. As contrasted with descriptive inquiries, reflective inquiries are concerned with problems of validation, with the valid in thought, in behaviour or in being. Reason in its descriptive capacity marshals the facts without commentary; reason in its reflective capacity strives to transcend the brute givenness of things and seeks the universal, the real, the valid, the necessary.

There is, then, for the non-empiricist philosopher, in addition to the tautologies of mathematics and the descriptive propositions of science another type of cognitive proposition. This is the reflective proposition of philosophy which seeks in some sense to assess the actual in the light of the real. Reflective propositions are cognitive in the sense that they lay claim to knowledge about a dimension of reality, although they are not factual in the sense of simply denoting sense data. Since these propositions intend to assert something about the nature of reality, they must be synthetic propositions, and since they are not founded solely on sense data, they must have an *a priori* character. The recognition of the reflective function of reason is therefore bound up with the recognition of synthetic *a priori* propositions, and the reflective propositions of metaphysics as of the other normative philosophical disciplines can demand a hearing along with the descriptive propositions of the sciences only if the court allows synthetic *a priori* propositions. This is what Kant saw very clearly, and it is to the merit of the Logical Positivists that they have grasped this insight more effectively than perhaps any other school of contemporary philosophy. The three problems of the function of reason, of the status of metaphysics, and of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge are ultimately one problem.[1]

[1] It is for this reason that the great tradition in the history of philosophy has waged a persistent war against the various forms of metaphysical nominalism. Nominalism is the construing of reality as brute fact. It is the denial that the particular manifests any universal nature or essence to which it is pledged to conform. Nominalism thus implies that any standards set up to criticize the individual cannot be other than arbitrary and conventional, for it denies any reflective function to reason and holds that all knowledge comes by way of the senses and is about particular facts. Nominalism sees in universals only arbitrary names which may be teleologically convenient, but which do not represent necessities in the nature of things. It regards a definition not as an effort to get at the essential nature of a thing, but merely as a resolution to use a conventional symbol in a certain way. As there are no real necessities in things, reason can make no contact with reality, and since reason has no power of rational insight it is limited to its descriptive function and must content itself with rearranging conventional designations. Nominalism, therefore, looks upon reflective inquiries as illegitimate. For if the particular fact alone has reality, then the ideal has no valid claim on the actual, and as a consequence normative or reflective statements have no basis in reality, and descriptive inquiries alone are *a propos*. Hence from the standpoint of the great tradition in the history of philosophy the nominalist is the *advocatus diaboli* if not the devil himself. For only if there are universal

Is it possible to reach any decision as between these two contrasting philosophical traditions, or is the philosopher here confronted with an ultimate choice to which logical considerations are not germane? It would probably be safer and certainly more in keeping with the general spirit of the times to hold that the conflict is incapable of resolution on purely rational grounds and that any decision in the matter involves an ultimate orientation on the part of the individual philosopher which reflects his total personality and temperament. Indeed, when one considers that the argument between empiricists and non-empiricists has in one form or another been coeval with the history of philosophy itself, it seems presumptuous to hope to settle the matter at this late date in favour of one contestant or the other. Nevertheless, I shall venture the thesis that empiricism is a position which is not ultimately self-supporting, and that so far as it appears to stand up it rests not entirely on its own premises, but relies like stage scenery on other props which are not immediately visible to the audience. When the issue between empiricist and non-empiricist is formulated in terms of the status and presuppositions of reflective inquiries, empiricism stands revealed as a self-refuting philosophy, for it then becomes manifest that empiricism as a doctrine is itself the result of a reflective investigation—though it does not openly recognize the existence of reflective inquiries—and that as such it is inescapably committed to a metaphysical position—though it avows the meaninglessness of metaphysical discourse. It is only the fact that empiricism is not a sufficiently self-conscious philosophy which allows it to exempt itself from the principles which it lays down for other philosophies and which makes it possible for it to violate with an easy conscience the Golden Rule of philosophy: Grant unto others what you presuppose for yourself. In particular, Logical Positivism, as a contemporary representative of the empiricist tradition, appears to be merely another instance of the perennial effort to hunt with the hounds while running with the hare. Its failure to recognize itself as such must be ascribed to its unwillingness to confront this fatal dilemma: *Logical Positivism must concede the existence of reflective inquiries if it is to claim any significance for its fundamental assertions; it cannot admit the legitimacy of reflective inquiries and remain Logical Positivism.* Once this dilemma is honestly faced and thought through, it becomes evident that the basic assertions of the Logical Positivist are advanced as synthetic *a priori* propositions, that at least some of his

natures in addition to particular things, only if there are ideals which form part of the grain of reality, and only if the human cognitive faculty has the capacity for apprehending what is not evident to the senses, in short only if reason has the power of "seeing" the necessary in the particular, can reflective inquiries be admitted as genuine.

definitions are intended as *real* definitions and are more than conventional resolutions regarding the use of marks, and that the activity he carries on and by virtue of which he arrives at his conclusions is fundamentally neither the mathematico-deductive one nor the empirical one, but is of the nature of a reflective inquiry. For though he claims for his conclusions both objective reference and necessity, yet he must agree that these conclusions are neither empirical statements nor tautologies. They must, therefore, be reflective statements, for these alone claim objective reference without being empirical.

In what way, for example, are we to interpret the famous empirical criterion of meaning which constitutes one of the basic theses of Logical Positivism? What is its status among propositions? What kind of knowledge claim does it make for itself? It surely does not intend to be merely descriptive of the psychology of the Logical Positivist, for as a report on the manner in which his own mind customarily functions it would not define a philosophical position and would have no valid claim on the attention of philosophers. Nor will it do to interpret the principle as constituting a report on the *de facto* state of current linguistic usage, for as such it would permit no deductions with regard to the intrinsic possibility or impossibility of metaphysical discourse. If the criterion has any content at all, if it does assert some real state of affairs, then it cannot be a tautology; and since it is not itself a confirmable empirical statement, it must perforce be interpreted as a reflective proposition based on rational insight. What the Logical Positivist intends by the empirical criterion of meaning is neither a sociological summary of actual linguistic usage nor a biographical note on the limitations of his own mind, but a philosophical theory of the real essence of language as such. And if he has indeed apprehended the true nature of language, then he may legitimately proceed to rule on the kinds of discourse which are permissible, and philosophers are bound to heed his words.

But this interpretation of the empirical criterion of meaning—the only interpretation which grants it any philosophical significance—implies that it is a *real* and not a nominal definition of language. As a real definition, the criterion would have a cutting edge, and with it the Logical Positivism could then proceed to hack down the metaphysical dragon. A knowledge of the real essence of language would allow what no sociology or psychology of language could achieve, namely, a deduction of the impossibility of metaphysics in principle. And this puts the Logical Positivist in a most embarrassing predicament: his basic criterion has philosophical significance only if it is taken as a real definition; to regard it as such is to abandon empiricism which cannot tolerate such definitions.

It has become fashionable, as positivists have gained sophistica-

tion from the criticisms of their opponents, to reinterpret the empirical criterion of meaning as a proposal or recommendation that philosophers limit themselves to propositions susceptible of empirical confirmation. In this way, the Logical Positivists hope to be freed from the embarrassing necessity of having to interpret the criterion as either an analytic tautology or as an empirical statement of fact, or as a reflective statement of the essential nature of language. The issuing of recommendations is, of course, the prerogative of any philosopher, but the only difficulty here is that a proposal provides no basis for deciding questions of fact. Whether metaphysical discourse is or is not legitimate cannot be settled by any conventions regarding the manner in which philosophers are henceforth to conduct themselves. The metaphysician cannot be compelled to heed the proposal, for it is a perfectly arbitrary one according to the positivist's own presuppositions. There is no conceivable way in which the proposal could be validated and rescued from arbitrariness, for the positivist will allow only descriptive inquiries, and his proposal thus amounts to the propounding of a nominal definition of "meaning." As regards nominal definitions, the situation is that of Israel under the judges—each man doeth that which is right in his own heart. The attempt to issue nominal definitions which shall be binding is the attempt to create philosophy by fiat.[1]

A similar situation prevails in connection with the term "cognitive." Logical Positivism makes an emphatic distinction between "cognitive" and "emotive" discourse, and is wont to consign metaphysical and moral judgments to the realm of "emotive" discourse. The degree "cognitive" is conferred upon all candidates which successfully fulfill the requirements of the empirical criterion of meaning. But the precise meaning of the term "cognitive" is nowhere clarified. Does it possess an antecedent meaning of its own, or is its entire content given it by the equation: cognitive statements = statements fulfilling the empirical criterion of meaning? If the latter is the case, then the assertion that metaphysical or moral judgments are noncognitive because they do not fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning will produce no great alarm among metaphysicians and moralists, for it is then simply the harmless tautology that metaphysical and moral propositions do not fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning because they do not fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning. On the other hand, if the term "cognitive" does have some antecedent meaning of

[1] The feeble attempt is sometimes made to justify the proposal on the grounds of its practicality, namely on the grounds that use of the empirical criterion has yielded results in science. But only the employment of antecedent standards of value, all of which according to the positivist are arbitrary, will enable one to decide which results are "results," for every mode of activity has results of some kind.

its own, then the equation of "cognitive" with "fulfilling the empirical criterion of meaning" is a synthetic proposition, and one would like to know how it could possibly be validated. Is it an *a posteriori* judgment? What experience could possibly substantiate it? Does the equation represent a synthetic *a priori* judgment based on a rational intuition? But there can be no such judgments according to the positivist.

The difficulty in which the Logical Positivist is involved at this point results again from the fact that while on the one hand he denies the existence of real definitions, on the other hand he presents a definition which is significant only on the assumption that it is not merely a nominal one. So long as "cognitive" is merely a convenient abbreviation for the longer expression "fulfilling the empirical criterion of meaning," the anti-metaphysical thesis is merely the tautology that metaphysical statements do not fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning because they do not fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning. The positivist would like to be able to say "This is what 'cognitive' really does mean," but his nominalistic premises preclude such utterances. In ordinary discourse, the term "cognitive" signifies "having reference to and disclosing the character of reality," and if reality is in truth wholly sensory in character, then all significant propositions must be descriptive of sense-data, and the positivist would be fully within his rights in refusing cognitive status to the propositions of ethics and metaphysics. But what are the grounds for affirming the exclusively sensory character of reality? Only an insight into the nature of reality could provide the basis for deciding the matter. In other words, it is only metaphysics (i.e. the knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality) which can furnish the standpoint from which one may determine which propositions are cognitive—that is, which propositions do in fact refer to reality. That reality is wholly sensory in character, and that, therefore, cognitive propositions must fulfill the empirical criterion of meaning, involves a metaphysical thesis which cannot possibly be demonstrated via any analysis of language. The erroneous notion that a theory of the limits of language can be erected independently of any metaphysical assumptions and solely by some process of "logical analysis" is the fundamental illusion which underlies the whole linguistic approach to philosophy which has mislead so many philosophers in recent years. A perfect example of this illusion is provided by the title of one of Carnap's articles, "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache."[1] The title obviously carries the implication that the analysis of language provides a neutral vantage-point outside all metaphysical systems from which their nonsensical character becomes apparent, but the article itself clearly reveals that the lin-

[1] *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 219.

guistic analysis is but a metaphysics in disguise. It is nominalism which is concealed under the sheep's clothing, and Carnap's thesis in the end amounts to little more than the dogmatic assertion that since metaphysical nominalism is true, all other metaphysical systems must be repudiated. Logical Positivism is not merely a theory of language—as it claims to be; it is simultaneously a metaphysic.[1] And empiricism in general is not merely the delimitation of knowledge to the description of the sensory; it is also the confining of reality within the limits of the sensory. The vaunted analysis of language provides no refutation of metaphysics; it merely sets up without argument one particular type of metaphysics.

"Logical analysis" is the rubric under which the positivist seeks to define the entire scope of legitimate philosophical activity. The term obviously occupies a place of fundamental importance in his scheme, for it is supposed to denote the kind of activity in which he conceives himself to be engaged. His own assertions involve some sort of knowledge claim which is neither of the scientific nor of the mathematical kind. The proposition that science and mathematics are the whole of knowledge is itself advanced as a piece of knowledge, and yet it is neither science nor mathematics. What, then, is it? There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between the explicit assertion that science and mathematics exhaust the field of genuine knowledge and the claim that Logical Positivism as a system of propositions is also significant. Wittgenstein conceded the contradiction and viewed his own writing as nonsense—though important nonsense. But most Logical Positivists have not been able to rest comfortably in such a paradox, and have sought other ways of meeting the difficulty.

Carnap endeavours to evade the paradox by means of a proposed distinction between "object sentences" and "logical sentences." The latter, he holds,

> do not refer directly to the objects, but to sentences, terms, theories, and so on, which themselves refer to objects.[2] . . . Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science—that is to say, by the logical analysis of the concepts and sentences of the sciences, for *the logic of science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science.*[3] . . . The non-metaphysical logic of science, also takes a different point of view from that of empirical science, not, however, because it assumes any metaphysical transcendency, but because it makes the language forms themselves the objects of a new investigation.[4]

[1] The cat is let out of the bag in the following statement: "The term 'real' is employed in a clear sense and usually with good reason in daily life and science to designate that which is located in space-time and is a link in the chains of causal relations." Cf. Feigl, H., "Logical Empiricism" in *Twentieth Century Philosophy* (New York, 1943), edited by D. D. Runes, p. 380.

[2] Carnap, R., *Logical Syntax of Language* (London, 1937), p. 277.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

Science, in other words, is concerned with the whole field of real objects, whereas the task of philosophy is to study the linguistic statements which make up the body of science. In this fashion, Carnap attempts to assign to philosophy a domain which shall be neither that of the empirical scientist nor that of the mathematician. The statements of philosophy will not be empty of all content as are the tautologies of mathematical logic, nor will they refer to objects which are the exclusive concern of the sciences. Thus driven, on the one hand, by the need of finding a locus outside of mathematics and science for philosophy—and for his own intellectual activity, and, on the other hand, prohibited by his empiricist premises from granting validity to reflective inquiries, Carnap is forced to resort to the expedient of assigning the study of language forms as the sole area of philosophical activity. *Logical analysis is the Logical Positivist's substitute for reflective inquiries.*

In the end, however, this expedient accomplishes nothing whatsoever, for we have only to plunge on through the camouflaging refinements of symbolic technique to discover that Logical Positivism is as defenceless as ever to a frontal attack which fires the question: Are the propositions of logical analysis merely analytic tautologies or are they synthetic judgments? They must needs be one or the other, on the premises of the positivist himself, if they have any cognitive status at all. But in the former case, they would assert no state of affairs and would permit no inferences in regard to the impossibility of metaphysics, and in the latter case they would belong to the empirical sciences. If it is true that mathematics and empirical science are the sole types of cognition, then the proposition of logical analysis can make no addition to the sum of human knowledge, and the Logical Positivist remains in the embarrassing predicament of being unable to give significance to his own remarks. Carnap's proposal that philosophy make the "language forms themselves the object of a new investigation" leaves altogether unspecified the kind of evidence which would be germane to this "new investigation." So long as reflective inquiries are not admitted as genuine, there is no possibility of distinguishing in principle between the "new investigations" and the disciplines which are already concerned with the actual functioning of language, viz. philology, comparative linguistics, the psychology of language, etc. These sciences in their totality address themselves to the empirical characteristics of language, and from the standpoint of a strict empiricism they say about language everything that can be said. What further aspects of language are there to constitute the area of logical analysis, and by what significant but non-empirical method does the positivist pretend to say about language what has been left unsaid by the empirical sciences of language? If descriptive inquiries alone are relevant to

experience, then there is no knowledge beyond that of empirical science, and logical analysis must then face the precise dilemma with which Carnap would confront metaphysics. "Metaphysicians," he says,

> cannot avoid making their propositions non-verifiable, because if they made them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the region of empirical science.[1]

How is logical analysis in a better way? If the propositions of logical analysis have any verifiable content, then they, too, by parity of reasoning, must belong to the region of empirical science. If they are not empirical, then they assert nothing about reality, and can be safely ignored by philosophers. The difficulty is the same one which has dogged the steps of the positivists all along, and it stems from the denial of the possibility of reflective inquiries. The positivist, in order to present his own position, is forced to make statements which obviously are intended to "say" something, but which on the other hand are very clearly non-empirical, and no squirming refinements of symbolic technique will save him from being impaled on the horns of the dilemma. Either there is a third kind of knowledge—distinct from the mathematical and the empirical—as the non-empiricist philosophers have always maintained, or else logical analysis is an enterprise as illegitimate on empiricist premises as is metaphysics. Logical analysis is not a substitute for reflective inquiries; it is either itself of the nature of a reflective inquiry or else it is nothing at all. The Logical Positivist can give no account of his own activity except by abandoning empiricism.

Philosophy has ever been a problem unto itself, and a recurring philosophical query has been the question: "What is a philosophical query?" The connected problem of the function of reason has created a great divide in the history of philosophy on the one side of which are ranged those who will allow reason to function only in a descriptive capacity, and on the other side those who recognize the reflective function of reason. The undisciplined use of reason has resulted in many a wild flight of speculation, and these in turn have evoked legitimate protest. Empiricism has been the opposition party in the history of philosophy, and it has made valuable contributions in this capacity. But it is one thing to protest against the abuse of a function; it is quite another thing to deny that it has any proper use. More than once in the history of philosophy a perfectly justified protest against an abuse has been erected into a whole system which would deny the use. Have not the Logical Positivists fallen into this ancient error? Could it not be conceded that certain (bad) meta-

[1] Carnap, R., *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London, 1935), p. 17.

physical discourse—their examples seem always to be taken from Hegel and Heidegger—is meaningless, without adopting the extreme position that the metaphysical enterprise is in principle without meaning?

What is perfectly clear is that the Logical Positivists have succumbed to a false ideal of clarity, in the name of which they are endeavouring to impose a "new order" on philosophy. The impressive successes of mathematics and physics have mislead them into the attempt to impose the same methods and criteria on all areas of human knowledge without due regard to intrinsic differences of subject-matter. This attempted "Gleichschaltung" is manifestly materialistic in tendency, and the sophistication of technique fails to conceal an underlying philosophical immaturity which needs to be reminded that

> . . . it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits.[1]

A razor is a useful instrument in some contexts, but a rougher tool is needed for chopping down a tree. Precision is not an absolute value before which everything else must be sacrificed. This is not to say that the philosopher should not aim at the highest degree of clarity and precision possible, nor is it an apology for those philosophers who "start from no discoverable premises; . . . proceed by means of puns, metaphors and ambiguities, and . . . resemble in their literary style glue thickened with sawdust."[2] It is simply to assert with Aristotle that

> . . . although we must also consider how we should express ourselves in each particular case, it is still more important to consider what the facts are.[3]

The first concern of the philosopher is with adequacy to the whole of experience rather than with precision and clarity of expression, and no philosopher is worth his salt who in the light of an antecedently and arbitrarily stipulated ideal of clarity proceeds to define out of existence significant areas of human knowledge. Slavery to method in the end spells philosophical sterility, and positivists would do well to ponder the words of Whitehead:

> Obscurantism is the refusal to speculate freely on the limitations of traditional methods. . . . The obscurantists of any generation are in the main the practitioners of the dominant methodology. To-day scientific methods are dominant and scientists are the obscurantists.[4]

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[1] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* (Harvard, 1939), trans. by H. Rackham, p. 9.

[2] Broad, C. D., *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1933), Vol. I, p. lii.

[3] Aristotle, *The Metaphysics* (Heinemann, 1933), trans. by Hugh Tredennick, Vol. I, p. 325.

[4] Whitehead, A. N., *The Function of Reason* (Princeton, 1929), p. 34.

The over-concern with precision of expression so characteristic of Logical Positivism is partly the result of a mistaken conscientiousness, but this conscientiousness itself is in part at least the result of a rationalization of a lack of real content. Refinement of technique often masks a paucity of ideas, and many philosophers to-day are approaching the position of saying nothing at all but of saying it with an elegant precision. It is no accident that the Logical Positivists have thus far had so little to say about the "problems of men." The preoccupation with linguistic analysis, the elaboration of symbolic techniques, and the constant proliferation of technical vocabularies will not permanently conceal an inner philosophical vacuity. Eventually, as in Andersen's fairy tale, an innocent bystander will be moved to declare that the king is naked. "Semantics" is currently the new shibboleth in philosophy, but sooner or later the linguistic approach to philosophy will be revealed as but another of the perennial attempts to evade the duty of hard metaphysical thinking. "Linguisticism" will then be added to the long list of other "isms" which have unsuccessfully aspired to supersede metaphysics. It is bound to fail for the same reason that all the others have failed, for in relation to them all, metaphysics can say with Emerson's Brahma "When me they fly, I am the wings."

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

The paradox of contemporary German philosophy, its utter eccentricity, together with the fact that Germany is today divided into two or three Germanies belonging to antithetical or even hostile camps, forces the reviewer to consider any German books of interest to English readers whether or not published within the boundaries of the old Germany. How could it be otherwise seeing that whole schools of philosophy and psychology, like Phenomenology, Logical Positivism, *Gestalt*psychology, Psycho-analysis, and even the Philosophy of Existence (with Jaspers' departure for Basle) have left the country, and that some of the most interesting books are published outside Germany?

First of all, there are three books which concentrate on the fundamental changes going on in contemporary science and civilization. The first is by the professor of medicine K. v. Neergaard, *The Task of the Twentieth Century, the Importance of the Biological World-View for the Understanding of the Great Problems of our Time in Science, Ethics, Religion, and Society.*[1] The pages referring to biology are especially interesting. They reveal an anti-positivistic, anti-mechanistic and anti-materialistic attitude, a rejection of the monopoly of physics and a defence of the sovereignty of biology. Deeply impressed by the profound revolution in contemporary physics, especially in quantum mechanics and theory of relativity, the author considers it to be the task of our time (1) to apply the new principles, e.g. Bohr's principle of complementarity, to biology; and to establish the specific character of biological laws; and (2) to apply this new biology to the solution of most of the problems of our time. Neither the general world outlook, a hierarchical Universe, in which the higher levels are irreducible to the lower ones, nor the holism of his *Gestalt*biology, is really original. But there are interesting remarks about a "quantum-biology," about complementarity in biology, about the application of *Gestalt*biology to medicine, and about the harmony and disharmony, teleology and dysteleology, in organic life. The book is important as a symptom of a powerful reaction against the superficial "physicalism" of the Logical Positivists. This reaction, however, goes too far, and is almost romantic in interpreting physics as a part of biology. Moreover, the author is too rash in interpreting and accepting the results of modern physics (e.g. it is certainly not correct to say that the category of causality is eliminated) and in applying these ideas to biology and to the problems of our time. But the discerning reader, who is able to supplement the deficiency in analysis, will find the book stimulating.

Still more romantic is J. Gebser's *Abendländische Wandlung,*[2] which gives a popular account of recent progress in physics, biology and psychology. The author thinks that the new points are: (1) the transformation of the notion of time, (2) the principle of relativity, (3) the substitution of complementarity for dualism, and (4) the notion of discontinuous development. Paradoxically the fact that the author is rather uncritical and does not always master his material, has an unexpected advantage, namely the inclusion of out-of-the-way material, such as Hans Kayser's *Harmonik*. Kayser believes himself to

[1] K. v. Neergaard, *Die Aufgabe des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 3. Aufl., Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich. Fr. 6.50.

[2] Verlag Oprecht Zürich/New York, 2. Aufl., 1945.

have found the bridge between *Haptik* and *Optik* (H. Friedmann, *Die Welt der Formen*, 1930) or between the worlds of the Tactual and Visual Philosophers (cf. Prof. H. H. Price's paper "Touch and Organic Sensation," *Proc. Ar. Soc.* 1943–44), namely in the sense of hearing; he further claims the discovery of the "harmonic law," i.e. a world-formula combining physics and biology. Gebser's book contains a useful selected bibliography. Bernard Bavink's scientifically reliable standard-work *Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften*, 7th ed., Lpzg, 1941, does not seem to be available at present, but there is a noteworthy posthumous paper of this author on the importance of the principle of convergence for the epistemology of physics. In opposition to a merely conventionalist or positivistic interpretation of physics he gives interesting examples which illustrate that different kinds of experiments lead to the same result, from which he concludes that there are certain limiting values (*Grenzwerte*) of constants which have a foundation in nature and are not conventional.[1]

Belonging to the same category, but of a very different kind, is Rudolf Kassner's *The Nineteenth Century*,[2] a remarkable *document humain* of our time. Kassner, the friend of Rilke and Hofmannsthal, a distinguished writer, a man of vision, a spiritual *grand seigneur* who has mastered the whole European literary tradition, including that of Russia, has written a book of European importance from a specifically German point of view. Whereas in this country a team of experts is attempting a re-assessment of the Victorian age, here a single person is engaged in a revaluation of the whole Nineteenth Century, and claims it as a specifically German century, where all greatness was *faustisch*, in which the individual prevailed and the will dominated over passion. It is a book of imagination. The author believes in imagination as a metaphysical principle and as the basis of "transfiguration" in art and history. Imagination is his strength and weakness. Kassner is thoroughly at home in the world of imagination, and the reader will enjoy many clever remarks about Shakespeare, Racine, Molière, Goethe, de Quincey, Macaulay, Lawrence of Arabia, Gogol and Dostoevsky. But Kassner neglects politics, economics and sociology. His remarks about the contemporary world of the collective are interesting. The German mind has gone full circle, the *Führer* appears now as the excrement of the collective! The reader will be well advised to concentrate on the last two chapters, otherwise he might be overwhelmed by a stream of truly Viennese rhetoric which adds assertion to assertion without references or proofs. Kassner is phenomenal, a strange mixture of genius and pretentiousness, an aesthete who does not play before God but before the mirror, who gets his visions from his mirror, and who accordingly mirrors our age in a peculiar and queer way.

The *Festschrift* for Fritz Medicus' seventieth birthday, *Natur und Geist*[3] is welcome as the first document of an international intellectual co-operation after the war. It contains a mixed bag of papers. E. v. Aster tries to prove, in opposition to Ernst Cassirer, that Erasmus represents more the "enlightened Middle Ages" than the beginning of the philosophy of religion of the eighteenth century. Julius Ebbinghaus, Marburg, contributes an illuminating paper on the present position of the moral sciences in Germany. He complains that the lack in precision of thought is so pronounced in certain circles that there is no basis left for scientific discussion. Indeed "the destruction of the purely analytic powers of the human mind" represents a most serious phenomenon

[1] *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, II, 1., 1947.

[2] Rudolf Kassner, *Das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert, Ausdruck u. Grösse*, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1942. Fr. 11.50.

[3] Natur und Geist, Fritz Medicus zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 23. April 1946, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich, 1946. Fr. 15.

in contemporary Germany; many members of the "nation of thinkers" have lost the faculty of precise, autonomous and critical thinking. Emile Bréhier's paper *D'une nouvelle orientation de la pensée philosophique en France* points out that Sartre's existentialism is nothing but an accident in France.

The tercentenary of Leibniz has been the occasion for several books. One of them, *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*,[1] publishes nearly all the lectures delivered at a commemorative meeting in Hamburg; they range from Leibniz to quantum physics, nuclear chemistry, medicine and moral science. Joseph König's contribution "Leibniz's system" is interesting, although a system of Leibniz does not exist, and although his interpretation is more speculative and stimulating than correct. He hegelianizes Leibniz, by taking Hegel's *übergreifendes Allgemeines* as the key-notion for the interpretation of Leibniz, i.e. the alleged Universal which as species comprises not only itself but also its contrary; e.g. Leibniz's notion of force implies active as well as passive force. This interpretation is by no means convincing, but stresses a somewhat novel point of view. Hermann Aubin adds an interesting paper on Leibniz the politician, who, believing in the unity of Western Christendom, combined a realistic sense of facts with the belief in an all-embracing Divine order. The well-known professor of physics Max v. Laue contributes a paper on Isaac Newton. I found C. F. von Weizsäcker's article on "The principle of continuity in contemporary natural science" especially illuminating. The *Beiträge zur Leibnizforschung*,[2] edited by Dr. Georgi Schischkoff, on the other hand, concentrate on Leibniz. There are papers about the young Leibniz; the principle of sufficient reason; Leibniz and Portugal; Leibniz' influence on Buffon, Maupertuis, Diderot and Robinet; Toland and Leibniz; Leibniz and contemporary symbolic logic, etc. There is no room for going into the details of the different articles. It can only be to the good that in this time of utter distress the somewhat neglected philosophy of Leibniz offers to German thought a focus for concentration. The English reader will find food for thought in this book. One author presents Leibniz as a rationalist and as the only truly consistent determinist in whose world no room for chance is left; another maintains that from the beginning Leibniz's intention was to beat rationalism with its own weapons.

Dr. Schischkoff is at the same time the editor of a new periodical, *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*.[3] This periodical makes it abundantly clear that in spite of enormous losses through revolution and war, philosophy and serious philosophical research are still alive in Germany. The following papers may be of interest to readers in this country: a very well-documented paper about Italian research on Ockham, by E. Hochstetter; a paper by L. Müller on Nietzsche and Solovyev; a very clear and concise article on Pascal's theory of science by M. Bense; and a paper by K. Reidemeister on intuition as a basis of knowledge. Besides that there are many others of interest to specialists.

Germany stands today between East and West. Notwithstanding her present political and military impotence her decision for West or East will be of the greatest consequence for the future of Europe and of the world. It cannot be doubted that the orientation of German philosophy is towards the West and that the centre of German philosophical life lies in Western Germany. In these circumstances it seems to be important to keep alive, between the philosophers of the Western hemisphere, the discussion which has continued throughout the centuries and which forms the basis of what we call the history of philosophy.

[1] Hansischer Gildenverlag, Hamburg, 1946. [2] Gryphius Verlag, Reutlingen, 1947.
[3] *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*. Herausgegeben von Georgi Schischkoff. Gryphius-Verlag Reutlingen. Bd. I; II, 1., 1946 ff.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

NEW BOOKS

The Missing Factor in Science. Inaugural Lecture by Herbert Dingle, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, University College, London. (London: H. K. Kewis & Co. Ltd. Price, 2s.)

This lecture is worthy of its occasion and of the ideals that led to the foundation of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at University College, London, twenty-four years ago. It is an arresting challenge to men of science to recognize the need of a "critical school, working within the movement (*sic.* of science) itself and performing the function, or at least one of the functions, which criticism has performed for literature from the earliest times." Professor Dingle does not mince his words on this issue: he describes the present state of science as one of "unselfconscious automatism," and compares its rapid and sure-footed progress to that of the mule in the desert. Without a knowledge of the history of science, he tells us, scientific workers are not educated men, indeed are a disquieting menace to civilization. He sums up this part of his argument with the cryptic statement that the history of science is science. By this I think he means that science is the one human activity in which past successes are not only causally but logically necessary antecedents of contemporary successes; or, in other words, that in science alone do we find a belief in progress which is continuously being justified.

Few philosophers would question the truth and timeliness of this part of Professor Dingle's plea. It might be suggested, however, that he gravely underestimates the contributions made by some of the greatest philosophers to the philosophy of science as he conceives it. Descartes and Leibniz, for instance, seem to me to have done their best work as critics—or perhaps rather as prophets—of science; much the same may be said of Locke and Kant, whilst more recently the writings of such thinkers as Boutroux, Poincaré, and Meyerson are instances of exactly the kind of criticism which Professor Dingle advocates. On the other hand, it must be granted to Professor Dingle that the more influential of recent British "philosophizing scientists" show a painful ignorance of the example and achievements of the thinkers I have just mentioned. Professor Dingle selects Eddington and Bernal for specific criticism. He takes up Eddington's statement that "the cleavage between the scientific and extra-scientific domain of experience is . . . not a cleavage between the concrete and the transcendental, but between the metrical and the non-metrical," and refutes it by instancing Darwin's discovery of the law of natural selection, a law whose discovery and applications involved no measurements whatever. As an argument *ad hominem* this has force. Nevertheless it is worth emphasizing that from the logical standpoint one of the most interesting things about Darwin's theory is that it takes the idea of a species, not as something fixed and logically primary, but as a temporary and local stability *to be explained.* In other words, biology with Darwin passes from being a purely classificatory science into being a science which looks for the causes of certain characteristic changes: and once this phase of inquiry is reached, scientists, in trying to give precision to their causal explanations, will almost invariably try to state them in quantitative or measurable terms. Against Professor Bernal, Professor Dingle writes effectively, but again not quite conclusively. Nothing is easier than to show the inadequacy of accounts of science—

common to Comtians, Marxists and some Pragmatists—which equate it with "obtaining practical control over nature through understanding it." On the other hand, spokesmen of these schools, for all the crudeness of their expressions, are presumably trying to state in their own way the relation of scientific to "pre-scientific" procedures—one of the tasks which Professor Dingle's "critical school" would certainly undertake.

Professor Dingle ends with a brief account of the Department of which he is now the head. This lecture, so stimulating and well-balanced in outlook, is a good augury for future research, in London in the history and philosophy of science. May the ideal—and the real possibility—of such research spread to other universities in the country, and spread soon! W. B. GALLIE.

Existentialism. By JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. 92. Price, $2.75.)

This book is a translation of a lecture delivered by M. Sartre in 1945, *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, and of the subsequent discussion. It forms an excellent introduction to the philosophy of Sartre. The serious student of Sartre's brand of existentialism will, of course, face up manfully to the formidable task of reading *L'Etre et le Néant*, which is not only the most important of Sartre's abstract philosophical works, but is also indispensable for a thorough understanding of his novels and plays; but for a preliminary and succinct statement of what Sartre understands by existentialism the reader can turn to the work under review, which is written in easily intelligible language.

Before discussing the content of the lecture, I should like to make some remarks about the translation. The translator has done well in endeavouring to preserve the flavour of the original, i.e. its flavour as a spoken lecture, and he would seem to have succeeded in his endeavour; but there are a few translations which appear to be inadequate or misleading. For example, it is surely incorrect to translate the initials M.R.P. as "Maquis Resistance Party": they refer, I gather from the context, to the Mouvement Républican Populaire. Again, M. Sartre did not make Dostoievsky say that, "if God didn't exist, everything would be possible": what he made him say was, "if God didn't exist, everything would be permitted" (*permis*). "Anxiety" does not seem an adequate rendering for *angoisse* (p. 22), which is elsewhere rendered "anguish," while "abandonment" might be a better translation of *délaissement* than "forlornness" (p. 60). "Stinker" is doubtless an excellent word in its way, and it is what one might call a "dictionary rendering" of *salaud*; but although I am not venturesome enough to offer an adequate alternative, I hardly think that "stinkers" conveys the meaning of M. Sartre when he refers to those who refuse to recognize their contingency. He has accustomed us to seeing people of "bourgeois" mentality referred to as *salauds*, and we know more or less what he means; but "stinker" has not yet acquired the same degree of consecration in philosophic English. However, it may yet do so; and in any case it would be frivolous to dispute about such a point at greater length. So "stinkers" let it be.

M. Sartre assumes for the purpose of his lecture that there is no God, that (therefore) there are no objective values, that there is no fixed idea of human nature to be realized, that human life and human history have no given meaning or purpose. Man, however, is free, and what he makes of himself depends on his free choice; he is responsible for his actions, but he is responsible to himself alone. One cannot quarrel, then, with the translator for saying in his introduction that "the chief effort of Sartre in

this short work is to face squarely the implications for personal action of a universe without purpose." However, the immediate task which Sartre sets himself in this lecture is to defend existentialism against the charge of being anti-humanistic. First of all, existentialism is not anti-humanistic in the sense of immuring the individual in his private subjectivity: "one discovers in the *cogito* not only himself, but others as well," the other being indispensable to my knowledge about myself. (M. Sartre treats this point at very considerable length in *L'Etre et le Néant*.) Secondly, existentialism does not teach capricious or irresponsible choice. There are no *a priori* objective values, it is true; but a man cannot choose without making himself responsible for his choice (which is a choice and creation of values) and without at the same time choosing and legislating (ideally) for all mankind. In choosing and in engaging or involving myself, I create my ethics; but I cannot create an ethics without at the same time legislating (ideally) for all. I am responsible for the choice in its totality, and so for others as well as for myself. My choice is thus not simply capricious or irresponsible. Thirdly, even though there is no theoretical limit to choice, a man chooses in a given objective situation, and he cannot but choose. The young man who came to M. Sartre during the war, in order to be guided in his choice between remaining in France and looking after his mother and, on the other hand, leaving France and attempting to join the Free French, was not limited in his choice by any *a priori* scale of values; but owing to his historical situation he was faced with an actual, limited possibility of choice, and he had to choose one way or the other. In doing so he chose his values and (ideally) legislated for all.

It is not easy to settle the question whether M. Sartre's brand of existentialism makes good its claim to be humanistic, for discussion of this question is profitless unless the disputants are agreed as to the meaning of humanism. As M. Naville observed in the discussion, "at the moment, everybody's a humanist." Sartre explains what "existentialist humanism" is, and obviously if that is accepted as a possible account of humanism, M. Sartre's existentialism is humanistic, since humanism would be, or would include precisely what he teaches. But it is doubtful if a doctrine can be called humanistic in any ordinary sense, when it denies the objective value of man. According to M. Sartre, man, so far as he is definable at all, is definable as freedom. Now, is freedom an objective value or is it not? Clearly, if there are no objective values, freedom is not an objective value. It is the "basis of all values"; but it cannot itself be an *a priori* value. "Value is nothing else but the meaning (of life) which you choose." Freedom, therefore, precedes the creation of value, and so it cannot itself be a value. But if freedom is not a value and if man is definable as freedom, man cannot be a value or have objective value. And does not M. Sartre assert in *L'Etre et le Néant* that man is *une passion inutile*? The possession of complete moral autonomy appears, indeed, to give man dignity; but to say that his life has only that meaning which he chooses to give it is to say that it has no objective meaning or value. Objectively speaking, life is an absurdity, and in a purposeless universe man would gain dignity rather by following Albert Camus's philosophy of revolt than by following M. Sartre's doctrine of *engagement*.

But is it so easy to deny consistently the objectivity of all values? "We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every particular circumstance," says M. Sartre. Now I do not make myself free: I am my freedom (as Orestes declares in Sartre's play, *Les Mouches*), my very existence is freedom. But if I will freedom, without having made myself free, it is surely implied that I recognize freedom as a good, as a value, and that this good does not depend on my choice. Again, if I "exist" by pursuing transcendent goals (in Sartre's

use of the phrase), it would seem that I must recognize these goals as having value before I choose them. I choose them because they have value or because I think that they have value: I do not create their value by freely choosing them, unless, of course, my act of choice is purely capricious. If "value is nothing else but the meaning (of life) which you choose," is this choice of a meaning a rational or an irrational act? If it is a rational act, then presumably I choose one meaning rather than another because the one appears to me to possess greater value than the other possesses; whereas if the act of choice is irrational, my choice is irresponsible and capricious, it is not truly a free act.

Existentialism of the type sponsored by M. Sartre may have value as a clear assertion of human freedom and as a counterblast to the worship of the collectivity, of the universal (which obtains in Marxism); just as the existentialism of Kierkegaard was partly a reaction against Hegelian Absolutism, so the Sartrian philosophy can be regarded as being partly a reaction against the tendencies manifest in economic materialism and determinism. But just as Kierkegaard was one-sided, so is Sartre. Moreover, there is about the philosophy of Sartre a certain frivolity of thought, which shows itself in the not inconsiderable assumptions he makes. Nevertheless, existentialism does represent and express the spiritual situation of a section of mankind, and as such it is certainly of interest. But though it has a human interest and though it may provide a salutary counterblast to certain other types of philosophy, it scarcely settles the problem which Camus declares to be the problem of philosophy, the problem whether life is worth living, i.e. whether life and history have or have not a meaning. It may be legitimate to say to those who believe that existence is purposeless "this is how you can give meaning to a life that has no given meaning"; but that does not settle the question whether all existence is actually "gratuitous" or not.

A small point in conclusion. When distinguishing two types of existentialists, Christian and atheist, M. Sartre cites Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel as Catholics. But though Professor Jaspers now accepts, I believe, the existence of God, he is not, and never has been a Catholic. Marcel certainly is a Catholic; but he was pursuing his philosophical way before he was a Christian at all. It was Marcel's consideration of human existence which led him to develop his philosophy in a different direction to that taken by M. Sartre.

F. C. Copleston.

Freedom and Civilisation. By B. Malinowski. (Allen & Unwin, 1947. Pp. 338. Price 16s.)

This work may at first strike the reader as a little out of date but any such impression would be mistaken. True it was written in the winter of 1941–42 with an immediately practical purpose—to make clear the issues at stake in the war. It was therefore intended for immediate publication, but the author's death before the work was quite ready for the press made this impossible. But the main part of the book which is concerned with the analysis of freedom and the conditions on which the maintenance of the values of civilisation depends is of permanent interest. Indeed the early part of the book where the practical purpose is in the forefront is the least satisfactory. For in his anxiety to bring home to his readers the evils of totalitarianism the author is, as he himself says, "arguing the obvious," emphasising principles which are "not startling or original but badly in need of being reaffirmed"; and he is apt to be diffuse, rhetorical and repetitive. But the development of his main thesis is relatively free from such defects, and no doubt such as there are would have been removed if the author had lived to give the book its final revision.

The author's main thesis is that freedom is "one and indivisible"; that it is guaranteed or denied not by the psychological make-up of the individual but by the constitution of a culture as a whole; and that its realisation requires that it should be embodied in concrete institutions.

The most important part of the work seems to me the analysis of the nature of a free institution and the account of the way in which institutions must be related within a culture if the latter is to be the embodiment of freedom. Here the author applies to the contemporary world situation the methods which he developed in his anthropological work and brings out clearly how freedom may be threatened both by the constitution of institutions and by the interrelation of institutions within a culture. In a brief review it is impossible to summarise an argument which ranges freely from the most primitive to the most advanced civilisations or to do justice to a masterly analysis which makes many incidental but valuable suggestions for the improvement of existing institutions even among the most democratic peoples.

The account of the meaning of freedom is less clear and convincing. In his desire to show that freedom is one and indivisible the author is in danger of confusing the issue by failing to distinguish the "freedom of achievement" for which the United Nations were fighting and the freedom of will or choice about which philosophers and moralists have argued. The latter he identifies (perhaps not without some justification in the writings of philosophers) with freedom from all restraints and it is easy for him to show that, so understood, it is incompatible with any ordered social life. Accordingly, while admitting that it is "psychologically grounded in the experience of the individual," he rejects the belief in it as an "error of subjective mysticism" and regards the discussion of it as "an idle philosophic pastime." But freedom of will or of alternative action either is or is not. It is not capable of being more or less like the freedom in which Malinowski is interested. Even if freedom of will is a fact, it is not part of the freedom for which the United Nations were fighting and nothing but confusion can arise from treating it as if it were. The two kinds of freedom are not necessarily inconsistent. Indeed the former may be the presupposition, the necessary though not the sufficient condition, of the latter. Malinowski is, of course, quite right in contending that freedom is not inconsistent with all but only with some forms of restraint, and much of the most important part of the book is concerned with distinguishing the kinds of restraint which are necessary to its realisation from those which are inconsistent with it.

A. MACBEATH.

Eclipse of Reason. By MAX HORKHEIMER, Director of the Institute of Social Research, Columbia University. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. 187. Price $2.75. [16s.].

This book is mainly a diagnosis of the present state of society in relation to philosophy. The author points out that reason, which the great philosophers of the past held to be capable of dealing with ends and values, has been reduced by pragmatism and positivism following Hume to a concern only with means. Thus the ultimate choices in morality, politics, and religion are now held to be non-rational. Reason became the tool of self-interest. But self-interest, like all human ends, is a mere preference, no better or worse than any other. Value is reduced to power. If irrational nationalism or fascist power-politics oust self-interest in the minds of men, reason must turn to be their servant, too; no moralist can object, for no choice can be condemned as wrong. Moral and political enquiry upon ultimate issues must have recourse

to Gallup Polls; economic enquiry becomes market research. Thus reason commits suicide.

Simultaneously the status of the individual declines. Man enslaves nature by planning and machinery, and then becomes himself the slave of the planner and the machine. His individual personality, unable to express itself in his work, is driven to find expression in his leisure. But his leisure, too, becomes the prey of commercialized recreation, stamping its mass-impress on his passive mind. Even the few individuals who seem to stand out above the herd wear a mask and have their greatness mass-produced. The dictator expresses mass-revolt; the successful business executive gets on by conforming to his type, hiding his feelings and disowning his values, if he has any; the film star is the creation of her own beauty experts and publicity men. In each of them the ordinary man sees not a personality other than his own, but the personality he would like to have. It is a hero-worship which worships its own magnified reflection, which masks and degrades its heroes.

The great societies of the past—clan, church, nation—were hierarchical and enforced some uniformity. But they admitted an independent realm of truth and value which they claimed to serve; as organizations they had aims beyond their own existence. The new societies—Trade Union, Trust, Communist Party, Planning State—are also hierarchical and demand conformity. But they recognize no independent values and have no ideals. So "efficiency" (but efficiency for no end) is their only standard. Promotion in church or nation depended often enough no doubt on mere ambition and drive, but sometimes also on devotion to the ideals for which the society stood. Thus nation-states did produce power politicians, but also Mazzini and Masaryk. The Roman Catholic Church had a Newman as well as a Manning. But the modern association is run by efficiency men whose skill in production-technique, opinion-control, or man-management is unrelated to any ethical or political end and who, therefore, can be taken on by any cause or interest.

Philosophy has shared in this social decline. It hires itself out to the power system dominant in its society—true to its own doctrine that thought and truth are the mere instruments of non-rational purposes. Or else it retires into its ivory tower and plays chess with its symbols.

Such is the diagnosis. The panaceas which are popular are worthless. To look for salvation to scientists or economists, to technocrats or engineers, to planners or business-men, to pragmatists or positivists, would be to perpetuate our present chaos. For it is just the dissociation of all these saviours from any objective values or any creative use of reason that has brought us where we are. To swing by reaction to some earlier faith, as the fascists or the neo-Thomists advise, is hopeless. An appeal to tradition shows tradition is dead.

In his last chapter Professor Horkheimer sketches the kind of philosophy which he thinks we need. This section is brief and obscure; but it is intended to be no more than a pendant to the main argument.

This argument—analysis, diagnosis, and criticism—is impressive and convincing. It is not easy to read and does not always clearly distinguish the different senses (or uses) of "reason"; and it contains a mixture of philosophy and sociology which is difficult to disentangle. But it is written with great spirit and great seriousness, and it contains many stimulating and striking observations. Much of its generalization is bold yet usually convincing. It should form an excellent basis for a discussion group of able or advanced students.

J. D. MABBOTT.

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY: Supplementary Volume XX. *Logic and Reality.* (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd, 1946. Pp. 232. 21s. net.)

R. B. BRAITHWAITE. Inaugural Address: *Belief and Action.* (In response to Price's appeal in his Inaugural Address in 1945 that philosophers should become concerned with the intellectual problems of the plain man, Mr. Braithwaite tries to salvage from the logical positivists certain non-verifiable beliefs in which the plain man is interested, e.g. religious, ethical and even metaphysical. Belief involves not only cognitive attitudes but also appropriate action. Non-verifiable beliefs may be such that though neither true nor false they may affect the "springs of action" and change a believer's subsequent action as e.g. after religious conversion. Braithwaite hopes that "By emphasising the pragmatic and behaviouristic element common to all kinds of sincere belief, whether verifiable or unverifiable, I may have made it appear less shameful to hold unverifiable beliefs." But since he does not explain *what* in a non-significant proposition *does* affect the "springs of action," the plain man will not derive much comfort from Mr. Braithwaite's concession.) G. RYLE, C. LEWY, K. R. POPPER. Symposium: *Why are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic applicable to Reality?* Prof. Ryle confines himself to the application of logic. He distinguishes three senses of "apply": (1) the specification of a general rule, which is an application of it; (2) the drawing of a conclusion from a specification in accordance with the general rule; (3) the sense in which a description fits that which it describes. The confusing of these senses has caused mistakes. Logic has been thought to apply to facts in sense (3) whereas it consists of rules constituting criteria of the correct or incorrect performance of intellectual operations and can be applied only in senses (1) and (2). Procedure-rules, which include those of logic, are of two kinds: Procrustean, which define the type of operation to which they apply and can be formulated independently of those operations, and canons of style, strategy, etc., which are not codifiable but exhibited in the skill with which operations are performed. Induction proceeds by canons rather than by strict principles. LEWY observes that principles of logic are not merely "skeletons" specified in particular instances, as Ryle thinks, but propositions, therefore, true or false. The problem of application turns on what facts make them true. Might a different experience require a non-propositional logic, e.g. without a law of contradiction? K. POPPER agrees fundamentally with Ryle in an interesting paper, difficult to summarize, which takes account of the application of arithmetic as well as logic. Principles of inference are useful because they lead from true premisses to true conclusions. When premisses and conclusions are both empirical they apply to facts. But facts are not "raw," but a product of language and reality. New languages may *create* new facts. This somewhat difficult conception is not fully explained. Obviously, the sense in which the fact that St. Paul's Cathedral exists is a product of St. Paul's and the English language is different from that in which the building is a product of stones and the skill of Sir Christopher Wren and its builders. L. J. RUSSELL, J. D. MABBOTT, A. M. MACBEATH. Symposium: *Is Anthropology relevant to Ethics?* (Prof. Russell questions the assumption of most psychologists that human beings have a fixed nature, and of most ethical philosophers that they have a set of duties independently of a particular social environment. Moral judgments concern social institutions and are meaningless apart from them. He admits that institutions themselves may be judged and a period, like our own, in which many are being challenged may seem one of moral chaos. Mr. MABBOTT thinks Prof. Russell should conclude that an action is right independently of consequences if it supports a good institution, i.e. that utilitarianism is false

though intuitionists are wrong to suppose that such duties are known from self-evident maxims. Prof. MACBEATH points out the similarity between the ethical views influenced by anthropology and those of earlier Idealists, Bradley and Bosanquet. The ultimate justification of an institution, however, must be found in some conception of the good life for man.) J. WISDOM, J. L. AUSTIN, A. J. AYER. Symposium: *Other Minds*. (Mr. WISDOM opens with a quotation from Proust to illustrate his favourite riddle "How do we know that other minds exist?" We all sometimes know how another feels but not as we know our own feelings, etc., so we may always be mocked by another's signs of grief, joy, fear. We then conceive as an ideal the knowing others as we know ourselves which we seem forbidden to reach since it is self-contradictory. With his usual skill Mr. Wisdom turns the puzzle this way and that and never without illumination, yet one is left wondering at the end whether he regards it as a bubble which should burst or an insoluble conflict of the human heart (p. 147). Mr. AUSTIN devotes the greater part of a long paper to an acute and thorough examination of some common responses to "How do you know?" He concludes that while we sometimes know that a man is angry, the answer to "How do you know?" is never "By introspecting feelings." Prof. AYER re-capitulates the original problem, somewhat lost in the subtleties of the previous papers, which is not only that of whether we ever know but also whether we have good reason to believe that propositions about the mental states of others are true. If all experience is private we can never know such propositions by analogy. He questions this position, assumed by Mr. Wisdom. "Private" may be used in the sense of (1) privately owned or (2) privacy. If experience is private in sense (1) then the usual conclusion that an experient owns—and knows—only his own experience, follows. But if in sense (2) it does not. For privacy can be invaded and its secrets voluntarily—or involuntarily—revealed. Confession or telepathy might then count as knowledge of another's mental states. And when not revealed we may still assume their existence by analogy with those states of our own which we do not choose to reveal.) D. M. EMMET, C. H. WHITELEY, J. LAIRD. Symposium: *Can Philosophical Theories transcend Experience?* (Miss EMMET denies that they can significantly transcend all possible experience but may include conceptions which though not verifiable immediately, may suggest unsuspected connections between facts which may lead to new discoveries. She illustrates from Leibniz's *The Monadology*. Metaphysical models must, however, not be allowed to degenerate into ideologies. Mr. WHITELEY agrees with Miss Emmet that transcending experience may be permitted to metaphysical models which connect objects of possible experience by analogy. It is not clear, however, how these symposiasts would distinguish such "models" from scientific hypotheses. Prof. LAIRD discusses not whether philosophical theories transcend observation, but the prior question of whether the knower transcends himself in knowing. This seems possible in knowledge of past events. He discusses various objections to this view and concludes past events are sometimes known to have occurred. Then it is obvious that the knower does sometimes know that which he is not experiencing at the time of knowing.) M. MACDONALD.

Soviet Education. By MAURICE J. SHORE. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. xiii + 346. Price $7.50.)

This book, which would have been better called "The Marxian Theory of Education" (for only the last three Parts are about Soviet educational methods) is an attempt to meet a need which the author felt, no doubt in common with many others, for a "dispassionate and unprejudiced study" of

Marxist educational theory and practice "based on a thorough search and examination of materials and documents pertaining to the question." Judging by the author's evident competence in objective research and documentation, the book hardly does him credit. A combination of vagueness and verbosity, which either means that Dr. Shore really had nothing to say or has somehow failed to say it, pervades the argument, and is particularly evident in the concluding section where the author finally takes leave of documented narrative and submits "a few random notes on some comparative aspects of Soviet and American education." Whether from sheer muddle-headedness or because the author, as I suspect may be the case, finds some difficulty in expressing himself in English (there are such things as "pointing out as to how," "depends on as to who controls," etc.) these concluding pages certainly belie the publishers' claim that the questions raised in the book are "given a penetrating discussion."

As a source-book, however, students of Marxism will, no doubt, find the volume useful. It traces the development of Marxian educational theory and its continuation in Soviet educational theory and practice "from the theoretical Marxism of 1844, through the Paris Commune of 1871, to the present Leninist-Stalinist Program." The first two Parts follow the deviations of the original views on education through the "orthodox" and "revisionist" phases of Marxism; the third Part takes the story up to the Russian pre-revolutionary period, and the historic developments during the Russian revolutionary (Leninist) phase are analysed in the fourth and fifth Parts. In the sixth Part ("From Theory Towards Application") Soviet educational measures in the pre-war years are carefully described, and in the seventh the dynamic transformations of Soviet practice under the test of the "great patriotic war against Fascism." In the eighth Part, the author considers the significance and prospects of the Soviet view of the role of education as the main ideological weapon in the struggle for the "classless society" of the future. He lists as the components of the educational programme proposed for this purpose: "Soviet patriotism; bolshevist vigilance; socialist attitude towards public and personal property; realism to withstand the alien ideology inherited from the psychology of private property-ownership and petty bourgeois moods; socialist humanics, collectivism and comradeship; communist attitude towards labour and social responsibilities; conscious discipline; honesty and truthfulness; strong will; courage and persistence; cultural behaviour, cleanliness, courtesy, compliance and tactfulness. . . . A thoughtful and persistent education on these lines will produce, according to Soviet educators, the new men of the classless society" (p. 247). The argument is documented throughout "from primary sources in the original language." There are over fifty pages of "notes on chapters," an analytic table of contents, a copious bibliography, and a subject index. I repeat that the Marxist is likely to find here a mine of information very much to his liking.

Whether, however, apart from the historical interest, we are to suppose that the educationist has anything to learn from this book depends altogether on what we think of the primary Marxist assumption that education is an instrument of class-rule. It is this assumption which lends plausibility to the revolutionary intention of "changing the school from a weapon of bourgeois class rule into a weapon for the complete destruction of this class-divided society, into a weapon for Communist transformation of society" (p. 220 quoting a Russian source). The utter remoteness of this project from the Western ideal of a liberal education is but a further reflection of the cleavage which divides East from West, and it accounts, incidentally, for the author's failure to achieve even the beginnings of a synthesis in his concluding section.

Dr. Shore has executed his part of the work with such meticulous attendance to detail that one must infer that he cannot possibly have read the book in proof. He could not otherwise have failed to correct the unpardonable misprints which disfigure some of its pages. J. R. JONES.

Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of Pessimism. By FREDERICK COPLESTON, S. J. (Burns Oates. 1946. 12s. 6d.)

There are doubtless those who would regard Arthur Schopenhauer as a subject more suited to the investigations of the psychologist than of the metaphysician, but the justification for a philosophical study—as indeed for any History of Philosophy (a field in which Fr. Copleston has already worked with distinguished effect)—is surely that the pattern of reality which the philosopher is trying to reproduce is so many-sided and so complex that even the most bizarre-seeming thinker will have important contributions to make. And Fr. Copleston makes it abundantly clear that, behind all the eccentricities of the high-priest of Pessimism, there is no small amount of valuable and suggestive thinking.

The first chapter of the book, "The Philosophic Situation," in which the author briefly yet competently traces the development of thought from Kant to Hegel is worth more than a mere passing notice. Familiar as the subject-matter is to all students of nineteenth-century Idealism, the very economy of language employed provides a useful sketch-map for wanderers in that metaphysical jungle, with its luxuriant undergrowth. It is particularly valuable as indicating the conditions in which Schopenhauer's thought developed. The combination of Romantic feeling with some personal irritation against Hegel led to a rejection of his optimistic rationalism and the elaboration of a voluntaristic pessimism. The biographical sketch which constitutes the second chapter portrays the stages of the process. The modern psychologist would no doubt like further details of the earliest years of the philosopher's life, and of the relations between him and his mother and sister. Fr. Copleston suggests that the hostility between mother and son was at the root of his later misogynism. Another factor may well have been that his sister was not born until he was himself nine years of age, a fact which might well have led to the feelings of resentment which are, as we know, not at all uncommon when an only child is "supplanted." It might be argued that this sort of discussion is out of place in a philosophical study; but the author is obviously—and rightly—concerned to emphasise the factors which explain the psychology of his subject.

The metaphysical basis of Schopenhauer's general attitude to life is discussed under the heading "Life's A Dream"—a thorough-going development of the Kantian phenomenalism. For Schopenhauer, indeed, the phenomenal is the sole reality: he insisted on the inconsistency which denies to the noumenon any cognoscibility and yet maintains its reality. For the intellectual *Ding an sich* Schopenhauer substitutes Will—a blind, irrational Force, in which he finds the basis for his pessimistic *Weltanschauung*. Is there no escape from this all-devouring urge, which he entitles Will to Life, but which might better be termed Will to Death? A partial escape is provided by the Arts. But it is in Asceticism, oddly enough, that the true escape is discovered.

Of the industry and close study which have gone to the writing of the book there can be no doubt. At times, it is true, there is an impression of haste in the actual style (and Fr. Copleston really must read Fowler on "shall" and "will," "should" and "would" . . .), but as a whole the work is painstaking and scholarly. The chief criticism that suggests itself springs from what can best be described as a nagging attitude to the subject of the study. The author

defends himself from the charge which he anticipated of failing to give a "systematic, coherent and consistent" sketch of the Schopenauerian philosophy as a whole. It may be true that it is impossible to present a complete picture of what "he was really 'getting at'," but all too often the unfortunate man is subjected to a series of parenthetical pin-pricks and interjected comments, which not only obscure the general outline of what Schopenhauer was trying to "get at," but also suggest that there is lack of that sympathetic treatment which is called for if a man's thought is to be interpreted with complete impartiality. Doubtless Fr. Copleston felt strongly the urge that besets all readers of Schopenhauer to shake a little sense into him; but one's irritation is not wholly evoked by the maunderings of the original.

At the same time it would be ungracious and misleading to imply that this is anything like the main impression left by the book as a whole. To have laboured so assiduously at the task of reading and seeking to elucidate the tortuous and quasi-mystical language of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, to have charted the Waste Land of the pessimistic system, to have related it all to preceding and subsequent writers is to have earned the gratitude of all who care for the different aspects of human thought and opinion. It would have been interesting to see the writer relate the Schopenauerian metaphysic to that strange recurrent phenomenon—the Manichaean Dualism. Mani and his followers did indeed admit a principle of Good as well as a principle of Evil. For Schopenhauer, apparently there is but a principle of Evil. But there would seem to be a similar tendency at work in both systems. Probably the explanation is not to be found at the rational level but in the dark world of the Subconscious. Into those realms, as we suggested above, the metaphysician may feel reluctant to enter, since for him the proper subject-matter of investigation is the object of rational thinking.

T. CORBISHLEY.

Alfred Edward Taylor, 1869–1945. By SIR W. D. ROSS. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy. London: Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. 26. Price 4s. net.)

Taylor had read everything, and he was all too anxious to tell you everything about what he had read. There is a St. Andrews story of his going with Stout to call on Burnet. When the maid answered the bell, Taylor was talking hard and the callers paid her no attention. She closed the door in their faces and reported to Mrs. Burnet that "it was just twa wee mannies blethering." The story is not improbable; Taylor was not easy to interrupt. De Burgh once told me how he had met Taylor in an Edinburgh hotel: "Taylor had just read the ninety volumes of Voltaire's works, and he talked to me about Voltaire for two whole hours until I left, exhausted, to catch my train." Some personal reminiscences like these lighten Sir David Ross's memoir, most of which is devoted to a survey of Taylor's writings which may perhaps err on the side of generosity.

If a student is interested in the date, or the dramatic date, of a Platonic dialogue, let him consult *Plato, the Man and His Work*; but if he wants help in interpreting the dialogues, instead of a summary he had better look elsewhere. If he wishes to wander in the byways of Greek science or immerse himself in a sea of Pythagorean learning, the *Commentary on the Timaeus* is the book for him; but if he wishes to understand the *Timaeus*, let him read Cornford. If he wants a sample of Taylor's talk, he can turn to *The Faith of a Moralist*, but he will be disappointed if he expects taut and incisive argument in these Gifford Lectures. In the short life of Socrates, however, he will find

Taylor at his best, and he may wish that publishers had always imposed space restrictions on him.

It is more congenial to return to Taylor the man. Kindlier, more humorous, more puckish than the frontispiece of this memoir makes him out to be, he was specially helpful and encouraging to younger men. His immense learning was at every inquirer's service, although an inquirer about St. Thomas has been known to receive in reply a recitation of the curse from Tristram Shandy. He had high standards and high ideals; his book reviews showed that he expected others to live up to these, but he also imposed them on himself. A deeply religious man, he had a humility which did not always appear in his writings. The author of *Varia Socratica* was a considerable scholar; and no one would deny that he was one of the best read and most learned men of his age; but it is tempting to wonder, as he once permitted himself to wonder about David Hume, to what extent after all he was really a philosopher. T. M. KNOX.

A Treatise on Language. By Alexander Bryan Johnson. Edited with a Critical Essay on his Philosophy of Language by David Rynin. (University of California Press: Cambridge University Press. Price 27s. 6d.)

Alexander Bryan Johnson first published this book in New York in 1828 under the title *The Philosophy of Human Knowledge*. Eight years later, he brought out a revised and enlarged edition under the title *A Treatise on Language, or the Relation which Words Bear to Things*. It is this edition which Dr. Rynin has edited with a long critical essay.

His essay is by far the most valuable part of the present edition. He gives us, in a little over 100 pages, an outline of Johnson's work, a criticism of it and some supplementary remarks on the philosophy of language while Johnson takes over twice as long to expound a doctrine which has for us nowadays only an historical interest. This is not a criticism of Johnson's work, but we have learned from other writers what we might have learned from him if his work had not "fallen still-born from the press" and been lost to sight for over a hundred years. For this reason, among others, I cannot feel that this book is really worth the talent and care which have gone to produce it.

There is one aspect of Johnson's work which Dr. Rynin does not comment on. In spite of his sub-title ("The Relations which Words Bear to Things") Johnson did not intend his book to deal only with *semantics*. Parts First and Second of the Treatise deal with the relation between language and its referents but Part Third is described by Johnson as discussing the relations which words bear *to each other*, and Part Fourth treats the *uses* of language by human beings. That is to say, Parts First and Second deal with *semantics*, Part Third with *syntactics* and Part Fourth with *pragmatics*, to use the terms which have been made standard by the pioneer work of Professor Charles W. Morris. But though his programme is, in some respects, an anticipation of Morris' distinctions, Johnson has little interest outside semantics. He has no conception of a formal "logical syntax" or of a pragmatics based on psychology. Moreover, his actual treatment does not correspond at all well with his programme.

His book is a wordy and repetitious elaboration of two theses:

(i) No unit of language is significant unless it can be shown to refer to a distinguishable aspect of experience.

(ii) Though words have no "inherent signification," we are often misled by our familiarity and facility with words into forgetting that they are merely conventional tokens for aspects of experience. And when we are thus misled, we tend to talk nonsense.

This sounds all very familiar. But it turns out that Johnson's empiricism is

of so radical and naïve a kind that it limits the scope of meaningful discourse in a very startling way. "Experience" means for him *actual* experience, sensory or introspective. Sentences referring to merely possible experiences and sentences about the future are meaningless. Moreover, it becomes impossible on his criterion of meaning, to admit false sentences as meaningful. It may seem, at this date, something of a waste of time to expound and criticise such doctrines seriously. Dr. Rynin makes an excellent job of it, but I cannot help feeling that he would have been more usefully occupied in writing a book of his own on the philosophy of language. To judge from the introductory section of his *Critical Essay*, I am sure that it would have been well worth reading. But I would like to add a comment on what seems to me to be a serious failing in his approach to the subject.

He *starts* his essay by classifying the ways in which language can be used instead of making this the *conclusion* of an empirical enquiry. Now it may be true that there are just three functions of language and no more, but surely this is, if true, a *fact* to be established in the usual way. It is certainly not axiomatic and it is unhelpful, as well as unjustified, to take it as a postulate. It seems very queer to me that empiricists should use such *a priori* and question-begging methods as if they had inherited the vices of metaphysics without its excitements. For Dr. Rynin is not alone in this attitude. It is a failing he shares with most modern writers on semiotics. Morris and Gardiner are two distinguished exceptions. The first uses a psychological approach and the second is a philologist. It is difficult to see how any theory of signs will be of much value if it is not founded solidly on the facts of psychology and linguistics. And if empiricists ignore the facts, who will take them into account?

D. J. O'Connor.

A History of American Philosophy. By Herbert W. Schneider. (Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1946. Pp. 646. Price $4.50.)

American Philosophic Addresses, 1700–1900. Edited by Joseph L. Blau. (Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1946. Pp. 762. Price $6.75.)

These two books, the result of a common enterprise, are indispensable for libraries and for all students of American Philosophy, or rather of American Thought. Professor Schneider's book is not what one would call a history of philosophy in the technical sense, and specialists interested in the philosophical contributions of Whitehead and the New Realists may be disappointed. It is rather a study in American culture, something between *Geistesgeschichte* and *Kulturgeschichte*, philosophy being understood as a living force in the history of American life. Consequently it is of interest to all students of history. It marks, at the same time, an epoch in the history of American philosophy, for it expresses the coming of age of American philosophy and the rise of American philosophical self-consciousness.

The phenomenon itself is most interesting. Is "American" philosophy a fact, or merely a dream? Do these books indicate the rise of a new nationalism with all its limitations and dangers? The truly remarkable fact is that Professor Schneider writes his book in the face of his knowledge that no such thing as an "American" philosophy with a central theme, a dominant note, or a moral lesson exists. "America was," he says, "intellectually colonial long after it gained political independence and has been intellectually provincial long after it ceased being intellectually colonial. We still live on the fringe of European culture." Even to-day the goods imported from Cambridge, Paris, Vienna and Freiburg exercise greater influence than home-grown ideas. The

originality of American thought is rightly seen in the manner of adaptation, revision and variation of general philosophical ideas and standpoints.

In spite of the overstatement, "Our past is fully as confused as our present," the author succeeds conspicuously in ordering the vast material. His hypothesis is that first, in the age of Puritanism and Enlightenment, philosophy existed merely as *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, i.e. as the spirit of the arts and sciences without being itself distinguished as a particular article of faith or doctrine; and that only in the beginning of the nineteenth century did it become *λόγος προφορικός*. With the rise of Unitarian Orthodoxy philosophy became a technical discipline in academic curricula, and the influx of Scottish philosophy, especially of Thomas Reid's and Dugald Stewart's books, brought about a new division of philosophy into mental and moral philosophy. When orthodoxy gave way to idealism this "mental philosophy" was broken up into "mental science" or psychology and "philosophy proper," an amalgam of cosmology, metaphysics, and epistemology. And lastly, William James' proposal to make psychology a natural science shook the traditional distinction between natural and moral science and introduced the age of radical empiricism.

This conception and his predilection for philosophy as a living force allows the author to emphasize the little known at the expense of the well known, and to make, together with Dr. Blau, many discoveries of neglected persons, tracts, addresses, sermons, etc. One must be most grateful for the enormous amount of useful information, for the 95 pages of bibliography and the 55 pages of index. (A few anomalies occur; important textbooks like G. H. Sabine's *A History of Political Philosophy* or C. I. Lewis' and C. H. Langford's *Symbolic Logic* are not mentioned, whereas minor papers or books of these authors are listed.) Regrettable as it is, there is simply no room here for going into details which are most interesting and entertaining, e.g. Walt Whitman's enthusiasm for Hegel's Political Theory as representing the most thoroughly American points of view, and for Hegel's formulas as an essential and crowning justification of New World democracy in the creative realms of time and space, formulas "which only the vastness, and multiplicity and the vitality of America would seem able to understand"; or the antinomianism of Henry James the Elder (father of William James), who denied "with heart and understanding that man is by creation moral, and cherished with heart and understanding the most revolutionary hopes and aspirations with respect to our existing moralistic regimen."

The last chapter concerning contemporary American philosophy which Professor Schneider declines to write would have been most interesting from the European point of view; and it remains present, in spite of its absence, in the mind of the reader. To a larger degree than is usually recognized America has become not only the refuge of a great percentage of the European intelligentsia, but also the heir to whole schools of thought, like Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, and *Gestalt*-psychology. It has assembled an undreamed-of mass of material wealth, of natural and economic power, and of intellectual energy, which represents a challenge to the old world and cannot but have far-reaching influence on the future of human civilization. It may be the historic mission of American philosophy precisely *not* to become an *American* philosophy and to add a new nationalism to the old, but on the contrary to overcome the narrow national limitations of the modern era of European philosophy, and to take the leadership in the transition to a world civilization. Without giving up any of their valuable traditions the United States could continue to be an open market and a clearing-house for all possible fruitful ideas and systems of this globe, and might, at the same time, work out the pattern of a new world-society in which the nations (with their different

religions, arts, and philosophies) are preserved as cultural units and nevertheless partake in that unending discussion which is the life of the mind.

It has fallen to the Americans to play a leading role in the one world which is emerging (or at least in one of the two worlds). Will the American philosophers accept this challenge? On their response will depend whether or not the rise of American philosophy represents one of the major events in the intellectual history of our era. F. H. HEINEMANN.

Preface to Philosophy: Textbook. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING, BRAND BLANSHARD, CHARLES WILLIAM HENDEL, and JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. (The Macmillan Coy., New York. 1946. Pp. vii + 504. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book is divided into five parts, called respectively "What is Man?" "Personal Ethics," "Social and Political Philosophy," "The Meaning of Religion for Man," and "A World-View." Of these the first and the last are contributed by Mr. Hocking, and the remainder by Messrs. Blanshard, Hendel, and Randall, in that order. The Editor says of the book: "Here an attempt is made to promote clear and ordered thought about man and his progress, the individual and the good life, society and its problems, the significance of religion and the nature of reality."

This admirable object, however, seems to have become confused with others, of less intellectual purity. Mr. Hocking's aims, for example, are the relief of "cosmic anxiety," and the stimulation to high endeavour. He pursues them with gusto through close on 200 rhetorical pages, carefully eschewing any approach to rigour in argument or analysis. Mr. Hocking's short way with philosophical questions such as that which he calls the "bugaboo of determinism" may be fairly illustrated by two quotations: "Decision, as we know, is capable of hesitation. . . . A causal process cannot hesitate," "The fact of self-awareness and self-judgment is the tool of freedom" (pp. 70–71). Mr. Hocking's tools are metaphor, personification and the other devices of the rhetorician. His message is that Life has a meaning, that the universe is the expression of a single purpose and that men should co-operate with God. These conclusions are said to follow from an idealist "world-view" adapted from Berkeley.

Mr. Blanshard's essay is the clearest and least pretentious in the book, and the only one which has any merit as an example of philosophical method. I cannot believe that Mr. Blanshard thinks his section on "Ethical Relativism" is a refutation of the views he mentions under this name. But where he is not shocked (or anxious to protect his readers), he writes clearly and pleasantly. He passes in review the main types of ethical theory, showing how each emphasizes some aspect of our ordinary talk about the matter; and finally settles in a position closely similar to that of Moore's *Principia Ethica*. He fails to notice (or to mention) the point that the epistemological objections he raises against an intuitionism of rules apply with equal force to an intuitionism of ends.

Mr. Hendel's section on Social and Political Philosophy is prolix, platitudinous and very dull.

Mr. Randall thinks that "religious beliefs" ought to be taken seriously, but not literally. They are the "symbols of practical attitudes" which they express and sustain. I should have thought that, for most of the people who find them practically efficacious, they are beliefs in a much more ordinary sense. This is a sensible essay, but needlessly long.

The book is well bound, and clearly printed on good paper. I do not think

the essays of which it is composed are to be recommended as examples of philosophical method. But people who have a taste for uplift will find it satisfying.

P. F. STRAWSON.

The Source of Human Good. By HENRY N. WIEMAN. (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. Agent: Cambridge University Press, London. 1946. Pp. vii + 312. Price, 20s. net.)

This is a fascinating and provoking book. It is fascinating because of the richness of its suggestion, its vitality and hospitality to experience, its deep sincerity and religious (albeit unorthodox-religious) feeling. It is provoking because of the somewhat arbitrary use of terms like "truth" or "materialism," and more because of obscurity and unnecessary abstractness of much—but by no means all—of its language. Why do writers think it necessary to say this sort of thing: "Myth . . . is a construction of the imagination, not specifying the structure of events as they truly are but directing the organisms and the social process in service of creativity and the matrix of qualitied events relative to feeling-reactions, so that this matrix yields qualities more rich and vivid. This is myth at its best" (!) (p. 181). The basis of Dr. Wieman's metaphysics is (with a difference) what Americans (after Pepper) call "contextualism." His style bears this out with a vengeance, for it is often difficult to grasp clearly any particular proposition, and one has to have faith that somehow, in the end, one will intuit the quality of the whole. All the same, in spite of these irritations, I have found perseverance well worth while, and have ended up with great respect for the writer's powers of rich and varied insight. The book is important and should be read by theologians and philosophers who do not bar metaphysics.

The "Source of Human Good" is, emphatically, not human nature, a "created" thing, but what Dr. Wieman calls the "creative event," or sometimes "creativity" (which more strictly means (p. 299) the structure or form the creative event has). The author, who is Professor of Christian Theology in the University of Chicago, often calls the creative event "God," and the sovereignty of the creative event is indeed the central affirmation of his philosophy. But God is an (or the) event. Nothing more can be known to the human mind, and no explanation can reach deeper, than events and their structures and qualities. "Transcendental" (= transcendent) causes,purposes, beings are meaningless. This philosophy is a "naturalism" (or sometimes) a "materialism," with the difference trom traditional materialism that it is "a materialism including what is spiritual" (p. 301) and including, above all, the divine creativity. This (to my mind) strained and twisted use of "naturalism" and "materialism" is symbolic of the author's vehement and sometimes almost fanatical protest against everything transcendent. There is *no* transcendent God "the same yesterday and to-day and for ever"; if God is the same, that sameness and unity is an abstraction, an abstraction which applies only to the continuous creative event which itself is God. If Dr. Wieman prefers, as he does, the Jewish tradition to the Greek, in that the former asserts that sovereign Good works creatively in history whilst the latter emphasizes the reality of timeless forms, he also rejects utterly that element in the Jewish-Christian tradition which affirms a God beyond history. "No transcendental reality," he tells us (p. 8) "could ever do anything." And he adds, "It could not make the slightest difference in our lives except in the form of some happening, some event."

But, unless the question is begged by defining a "transcendental reality" as something which can't do anything, we can have no grounds (*a*) for asserting

its inactivity in relation to itself or to possible beings *other* than human. And if (*b*) it is assumed that if some event makes a difference in *our* lives, that couldn't be caused by a "transcendental reality," the question is again begged. Why could it not so be caused? Dr. Wieman, as far as I can see, never produces any real arguments to show that the creative event is not the act of a transcendent creator, but merely asserts this latter idea to be an abstraction or, sometimes, a myth. Perhaps there *are* extreme transcendence views which confuse an abstraction or a myth with a reality, but they are not confuted simply by affirmation of their polar opposite, radical immanentism. The facts present a puzzle which seems to require both factors, and if in affirming transcendence we have to use an abstraction, it does not follow that the abstraction—any more than any other—does not indicate a reality. In the case of human personality, the reality of the continuous event of personal life seems—however difficult the idea may be clearly to grasp, to require some "transcendent" or "pure" ego, and to say this does not imply that such an ego, being "transcendent," is entirely separate, unable to act, to enter into events; indeed, it was postulated to make their explanation less irrational. Equally, can the concrete historical reality of the creative world event be understood without the notion of creator? This is put here in the form of a question and not an answer, and to suggest that Dr. Wieman's answer (p. 298) that it is "creativity" which retains its unity and identity throughout events, will not do. "Creativity" and "creative event" (absolutely good and creative of all good) without "creator" is indeed as airy an abstraction as any. But divine personality is denied. Dr. Wieman discusses at some length (pp. 265 *sq.*) whether God should be called "personal," giving reasons why God is commonly thought so; and he concludes that personality attributed to the divine is a mythical symbol, and that because "a person is always a creature" *therefore* "personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator" (p. 268).

But though in the book I discovered no argued defence of the central and radical denial of all transcendence, his emphasis on immanence, on what we can be vividly aware of within our experience, is important, and Dr. Wieman not only charms the reader with his warm and wide sympathies, but develops the implications of immanent creativity in such original and suggestive ways that one wishes more than ever that he were easier to read. Since the creative event is the supreme reality, morality is conduct guided by general principles fitted to facilitate creative interchange between people and between the individual and his material environment: the common virtues are explained and enlarged by reference to these principles. And since the creative event is divine, and man a creature, the moral law as ordinarily conceived is servant and not sovereign, receiving its good and its sanction from what can only be known finally through religious insight. As for religion itself, Dr. Wieman rightly holds that while a few experts may achieve erudition about Buddhism, Confucianism, or primitive religions, such knowledge must be comparatively superficial, since a religion is a tradition, an intimate fellowship, a life. The cosmopolitanism fashionable among some intellectuals is pretty deadly, he thinks, and "man must drink deep from the well of his own vitality before he has the strength and insight to receive what others would give him." Since our tradition is Jewish-Christian, it is of this which he writes and (with the reservation already elaborated) does so with constant vivid insight. There is far too much in this book to summarize: Dr. Wieman has to be read, and is very well worth reading. He shows how the values of beauty and truth (in his rather special sense) and knowledge arise in different ways from the selective participation by embodied mind in the creative event. The chapter

on beauty is good. Americans have much to teach us on philosophical aesthetic, and Dr. Wieman is no exception. So again his understanding of evil and his elaboration of the distinction between evils rooted in the nature of things not caused by man, and those originating in human life, is profound.

I hope I have not given a total impression of damning Dr. Wieman's book with faint praise. The praise is grateful and sincere, though qualified by the criticisms I have made. LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

Books also received:

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. *The Psychology of Imagination* (translated from the French). New York: Philosophical Library. 1948. Pp. 285. 3 dollars 75 cents.

A. D. RITCHIE. *Essays in Philosophy and Other Pieces.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1948. Pp. 208. 12s. 6d.

Hobhouse Memorial Lectures, 1930–1940. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1948. 10s. 6d. net.

LOUIS J. A. MERCER. *American Humanism and the New Age.* Milwaukee, Wisconsin: The Bruce Publishing Co. 1948. Pp. 227. 4 dollars.

HUGH MILLER. *An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy.* New York: The Macmillan Co. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1947. Pp. viii + 616. 25s. net.

D. G. JAMES. *The Romantic Comedy.* London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1948. Pp. xii + 275. 18s. net.

F. M. TYRRELL, M.A. *The Rôle of Assent in Judgment. A Thomistic Study.* (Dissertation in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Ph.D. Degree.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1948. Pp. 184. No price quoted.

HENRY V. SATTLER, C.SS.R., M.A. *A Philosophy of Submission. A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy.* (Dissertation in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Ph.D. Degree.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. Pp. xii + 212. No price quoted.

GEORGE W. KEETON and GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (Editors, on behalf of the Faculty of Laws of University College, London.) *Jeremy Bentham and the Law.* A Symposium. London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1948. Pp. viii + 266. 20s. net.

FULTON H. ANDERSON. *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon.* Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press. 1948. Pp. viii + 312. 4 dollars.

WARNER ALLEN. *The Happy Issue.* London: Faber & Faber. 1948. Pp. 288. 12s. 6d.

MARIO PENSA. *Das deutsche Denken.* Erlenbach-Zurich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag. 1948. Pp. 416. (German translation by Walter Meckauer.) Cloth binding: 15 Swiss francs. Linen: 18 Swiss francs.

GUSTAV RAMMING. *Karl Jaspers und Heinrich Rickert. Existenzialismus und Wertphilosophie.* Bern: A. Francke AG. Verlag. 1948. Pp. 108. 8 Swiss francs.

KARL JASPERS. *Der philosophische Glaube.* Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag. 1948. Pp. 136. No price quoted.

KARL JASPERS. *Von der Wahrheit.* Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag. 1947. Pp. 1103. No price quoted.

P. DR. JOSEF STAUDINGER, S.J. *Das Schöne als Weltanschauung, im Lichte der Platonisch-Augustinischen Geisteshaltung.* Vienna: Verlag Herder. 1948. Pp. 336. No price quoted.

MAGDALENA AEBI. *Kant's Begründung der "deutschen Philosophie."* Basel, Switzerland: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft A.G. 1948. Pp. xx + 107 and 525. Linen binding: 40 Swiss francs.

MICHEL CARROUGES. *La mystique du surhomme.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1948. Pp. 436. No price quoted.

JEAN HYPPOLITE. *Introduction à la Philosophie de l'Histoire de Hegel.* Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie. 1948. Pp. 98. 125 francs.

FRANÇOIS NUYENS. *L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote* (traduit du Néerlandais). Préface par Augustin Mansion, Professeur à l'Université de Louvain. Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1948. Pp. xvi + 354. No price quoted.

Studia Philosophica. Commentarii Societatis Philosophicae Polonorum. Volumen III 1939–1946. Curantibus: K. Ajdukiewicz, R. Ingarden, K. Twardowski. Editum auxilio Ministerii Instructionis Publicae. Cracow & Posnan. 1948. Pp. 465.

INGJALD NISSEN. *Moralfilosofi Og Hersketeknikk. En studie over George Edward Moore's verdilaere.* Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard). 1948. Pp. 241. No price quoted.

LUIGI STEFANINI. *Il Dramma Filosofico della Germania.* Padova: Cedam—Casa Editrice Dott. A. Milani. 1948. Pp. 252. No price quoted.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

I agree so heartily with almost all of Professor Macbeath's article in your April issue, and consider his main theses so important, that I am emboldened to ask whether he would consider a change (not affecting these at all so far as I can see) in one of his descriptive phrases.

He shows that we judge what we ought to do, not abstractly, but each of us in the light of a certain plan or policy; an ideal not lodged merely in the future but working day by day. This he describes as the conception of "the good of the self as a whole." While I know that the phrase has a distinguished history, yet I believe that its continued use to indicate the guiding principle or scheme of the good life makes a very real stumbling-block for ordinary readers. There seem to be two objections to it, partly separable. (1) Conduct is so often determined by needs located elsewhere than in the actor's self. The tired mother sits up with the sick child because the child needs it. The same reason no doubt makes it simultaneously part of the good of her self, but it would shock her to be told that the latter conception, and not the child's need directly, was moving her. (2) Our attitude in important concerns is incongruous with the phrase. When the disinterested statesman toils with others over some reform, or the creator or discoverer loses himself in his work, he does not feel as if he were working in a scheme arranged round himself. Rather, he is striving to arrange himself round these things which he serves; to make himself a means and a detail for them. In so far as any man is religious, this will be his attitude at all times.

It is certainly difficult to suggest a phrase which shall avoid these objections and yet indicate some unity in the total life of each individual. Yet even the simple "This is what I really want" fits better, I think, than "the good of my self as a whole." Professor Macbeath himself has an improved variant in one place where he speaks of "the unity of the self's *interests*" (italics mine). Could we perhaps adopt the form "the good *espoused by* the self as a whole"? I have tried it in each of Professor Macbeath's contexts, and it seems possible.

He writes in another connection, "Moral goodness is not something at which we aim directly. . . . Moral goodness and other goods enter into the good life in different ways. . . . The latter are the ends to which it is directed, the former is realized in the pursuit of them" (pp. 112, 114–15). I should like to invoke a parallel to this. We do sometimes aim at moral goodness, but this is not our typical aim in the course of the good life. We do sometimes think about the good of our self as a whole, as in the reflective moment of youth described on pp. 101–2, but it is much more typical of the mature man to be working within a scheme of goods which he has espoused. These are the ends to which his life is directed. The good of his self is realized in the service which he gives to these.

Helen Wodehouse.

Swansea, April 27, 1948.

INSTITUTE NOTES

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Members will no doubt be especially interested in the programme of lectures for the session 1948–49.

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